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A VISITATION WITH THE FEDERAL LAW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN
EDWARD MULHALL, JR.*
The purpose of this paper is to generally acquaint practitioners
with some of the fundamental legal principles involved in the fed-
eral application of the law of eminent domain. Until the opportu-
nity, or rather the necessity, arises one does not realize the depth
and scope of legal principles which surround an exercise of the pow-
er of eminent domain by the United States. It is an exercise in
frustration to resort to more familiar legal analogies and to local
law only to find that the diverse nature of the legal origins and
fundamental guarantees compound the search with greater con-
fusion than understanding. The importance of some understanding
of the applicable legal principles is predicated on the realistic fact
that federal projects requiring land acquisition are increasing with
notable acceleration in the Rocky Mountain area.
The effort, of necessity, has been limited to quite general as-
pects of the federal concept of eminent domain and matters of re-
gional interest. No attempt has been made to include federal pro-
grams such as the Tennessee Valley Authority legislation or feder-
ally assisted programs such as urban renewal, public housing, or
highway programs. Nor has the field of valuation techniques, as
distinguished from the valuation process, been treated. No attempt
has been made to secure a comparative approach with standards
applied in state condemnation actions, except in those perhaps rare
instances where the author has felt that a comparative reference
might be helpful to facilitate understanding. One point of emphasis
has been attempted by referring to decisions of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in those instances where the author has
felt they have a bearing on the areas touched upon by this paper.
*Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Colorado. B.S.L., Uni-
versity of Denver, 1956; LL.B., University of Denver, 1958.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect the position of the Department of Justice or the United States
Attorney's Office.
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I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
As is the process with so many areas of the law, that affecting
federal eminent domain has been one of synthesis and progressive
crystallization over a number of years. Remarkably, however, it was
not until the latter part of the Nineteenth Century that the forma-
tive processes began. Early in this nation's history there was some
doubt as to the prerogative of the United States to exercise the
power of eminent domain. It was argued that the United States de-
rived its powers by a surrender from the several states by specific
grants, and inasmuch as the states had not specifically granted to
the United States the power of eminent domain such a power did
not exist.' Rather than create an antipathy from "state's rights"
elements, the practice in federal condemnation actions was to in-
stitute such proceedings in state courts and to apply state stand-
ards2-- even though the purposes for which the power was exer-
cised was specifically a federal power.
Aside from the early federal decisions involving the central
government's control in the District of Columbia, no colour of a
federal power of eminent domain emerged until 1875 when the Su-
preme Court announced its decision in Kohl v. United States.3 This
decision was followed by an amplification of the nature of the pow-
er in United States v. Jones,4 in which the Supreme Court stated:
The power to take private property for public uses, gen-
erally termed the right of eminent domain, belongs to every
independent government. It is an incident of sovereignty,
and, as said in Boom v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 106, requires no
constitutional recognition. The provision found in the Fifth
Amendment to the federal Constitution, and in the Con-
stitutions of the several States, for just compensation for
the property taken, is merely a limitation upon the use of
the power. It is no part of the power itself, but a condition
upon which the power may be exercised. 5
From the lead taken by the judiciary, Congress was relatively
prompt in enacting legislation, which in part contained what has
been described as the general condemnation statute, together with
11 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.24 (Rev. 3d ed. 1964).
21d. § 1.24[2].
391 U.S. 367 (1875).
4 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
5 Id. at 518.
6 Act of August 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1958), which provides:
"In every case in which the Secretary of the Treasury or any other officer
of the Government has been, or hereafter shall be, authorized to procure
real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses,
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a since superseded general conformity statute.7 Thus the substan-
tive aspects of federal condemnation principles were ratified by the
legislative arm of the government. The status thus established re-
mained for nearly forty years until the enactment by Congress of
the Declaration of Taking Act.8 This significant legislation permits
administrative determination of the public need,9 and the amount
of "estimated" just compensation, ° which when deposited in the
registry of the district court operates to vest title to the interests
or estate condemned in the United States." Another salient feature
of the Declaration of Taking Act is to toll the running of interest
on the amount of estimated just compensation deposited with the
court. 12 The rationalization is that the deposit, which the condemnee
may withdraw at any time, is in lieu of the property taken, and
being immediately available to the condemnee will not result in an
unfair deprivation entitling the condemnee to an award of inter-
est.'
3
With the adoption of Rule 71A, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which became effective August 1, 1951, federal condemnation
actions acquired procedural aspects which were purely federal in
character and superseded the theretofore effective general con-
he may acquire the same for the United States by condemnation, under
judicial process, whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous
to the Government to do so, and the Attorney General of the United States,
upon every application of the Secretary of the Treasury, under this act,
or such other officer, shall cause proceedings to be commenced for condem-
nation within thirty days from receipt of the application at the Depart-
ment of Justice."
7 Act of August 1, 1888, Ch. 728, § 2, 25 Stat. 357, provided: "The practice,
pleading, forms and modes of proceeding in causes arising under the pro-
visions of this act shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, plead-
ings, forms and proceedings existing at the time in like causes in the
courts of record of the State within which such district court is held, any
rule of the court to the contrary notwithstanding." This section has now
been superseded by Rule 71A, Fed. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C. (1958).
8 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), as amended 56 Stat. 797 (1942), 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-f
(1958).
9 Id. § 258a.
10 Id. § 258a (5).
11 Id. § 258a, which provides: "Upon the filing said declaration of taking and
of the deposit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled thereto, of
the amount of the estimated compensation stated in said declaration, title
to the said lands in fee simple absolute, or such less estate or interest
therein as is specified in said declaration, shall vest in the United States
of America, and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken
for the use of the United States . . . .
12Id. § 258a, further provides: "[B]ut interest shall not be allowed on
so much thereof [the award] as shall have been paid into the court [as
estimated compensation] . . . .
'5 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 381 (1943).
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formity statute. 4 Congress has further specifically provided for the
jurisdiction of condemnation actions 15 and proper venue.I 6
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides, in part, "[N] or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.' 7 This clause is the only reference
to the power of eminent domain contained in the federal constitu-
tion. Analytically, and despite early conception, it is apparent that
this provision is not a grant of power - quite the contrary. The
statement, as mentioned, represents a limitation on a power pre-
supposed.'5 This limiting clause is a condition on an important at-
tribute of sovereignty stemming from political necessity, and in-
separable from sovereignty unless denied to it by fundamental
law.' 9
It is of paramount importance to realize that this clause of the
Bill of Rights makes no reference to any person from whom proper-
ty may be taken or any other subjective corollary of personal rights
in the property taken. Except for this clause, the entirety of the
Fifth Amendment is a series of negations or denials of power in the
United States affecting subjective or personal rights. The last nega-
tion represents an objective limitation on an inherent power to take
and condemn property. The guarantee of just compensation is for
the property taken and not a personal guarantee flowing to any
owner, thus this clause distinctively differs from all other clauses
of the Fifth Amendment. In Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United
States,20 the Supreme Court described the nature of the guarantee
as follows:
[J] ust compensation .. is for the property, and not to the
owner. Every other clause in this Fifth Amendment is per-
sonal. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime," etc. Instead of continuing that
form of statement, and saying that no person shall be de-
prived of his property without just compensation, the per-
14 For an informative and interesting discussion of the background surround-
ing the adoption of Rule 71A, Fed. R. Civ. P., see 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE , 71A.05-08 (2d ed. 1955).
15Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1358 (1958), which pro-
vides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all proceed-
ings to condemn real estate for the use of the United States or its depart-
ments or agencies."
16Id. § 1403, further provides: "Proceedings to condemn real estate for the
use of the United States or its departments or agencies shall be brought
in the district court of the district where the land is located or, if located
in different districts in the same State, in any of such districts."
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'8 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883).
19 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875).
20 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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sonal element is left out, and the "just compensation" is to
be a full equivalent for the property taken .
1
Because condemnation actions are concerned with the property
itself rather than the rights of individuals, such actions are con-
sidered to be in rem,22 which has several important corollaries re-
lating to the existence of separate or multiple ownerships of the
same estate. "Ordinarily an unqualified taking in fee by eminent
domain takes all interests and as it takes the res is not called upon
to specify the interests that happen to exist.' ' -3 The effect of an
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the United States is to
create a new, clear title to the estate condemned in the condem-
nor.'21 The Declaration of Taking Act, when read in context, is quite
explicit as to the legal effect of the institution of a condemnation
action. It provides, in part:
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the de-
posit in the court, to the use of the persons entitled there-
to, of the amount of the estimated compensation stated in
said declaration, title to the said lands in fee simple abso-
lute, or such less estate or interest therein as is specified in
said declaration, shall vest in the United States of America,
and said lands shall be deemed to be condemned and taken
for the use of the United States, and the right to just com-
pensation for the same shall vest in the persons entitled
thereto.25
From the foregoing it can be seen that the power to condemn as it
inheres in the United States is creative rather than derivative, and
the power to condemn creates an entirely new interest or estate
rather than simply to acquire existing personal interests. Therefore,
interests otherwise unknown to the law of the particular state can
be created and the nature of existing interests cannot operate as a
limitation on the exercise of the power.
2 6
The existence of multiple estates or interests in a parcel of prop-
erty does not warrant a separate valuation of each existing inter-
est.2 7 The valuation is of the whole condemned.2 8 This is the prin-
21 Id. at 326.
22 United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 235 n. 2 (1946).
23 Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924).
24 United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 239 (1946).
2546 Stat. 1421 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1958).
26 United States v. Certain Interests in Champaign County (Illinois), 271
F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 974 (1960).
27 Bogart v. United States, 169 F.2d 210, 213 (10th Cir. 1948); cf. United
States v. Runner, 174 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1949).
28 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 50-6-13(2) (1963), which provides, inter alia:
" .. . The jury shall return a special verdict fixing and determining the
damages or compensation to be allowed to each defendant, severally." (Em-
phasis supplied.)
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cipal corollary of the in rem character of a condemnation action -
the action attaches and inheres in the property taken rather than
any existing, personal interests.29 Properly, then, the award for the
property taken is to be determined in gross by the triers of fact,
and this award is to be later apportioned among the several inter-
ests which may exist as an ancillary aspect of the principal proceed-
ing.30 The descriptive statement has been made, "If we attempt to
cut a condemnation proceeding into slices, it bleeds.
3 1
II. NATURE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
On occasion, the argument is advanced that particular federal
officials charged with certain administrative determinations dele-
gated by Congress have acted improperly in connection with land
acquisition.32 In effect, such an argument seeks to open the door for
a collateral attack or judicial review of the necessity, desirability
or public need for a particular taking. But it must be remembered
that the power of eminent domain is a legislative power, and the
exercise of this fundamental power is a legislative function.3 3 "Once
the object is within the authority of Congress the right to realize
it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. '34 The only pro-
per inquiry is elementary, so much so perhaps that it is easily over-
looked in the quest to come to grips with the seemingly more meaty
issue of piercing the bureaucratic facade. Properly, the question is
one of fundamental constitutional consideration. "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional. 3 5 More simply, the power of
29 See United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 350 (1892); Nebraska v.
United States, 164 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
815 (1948) ; United States v. 25.936 Acres in Borough of Edgewater (New
Jersey), 153 F.2d 277, 279 (3d Cir. 1946); Meadows v. United States, 144
F.2d 751, 753 (4th Cir. 1944).
30 Nebraska v. United States, supra note 29; Texas v. Harris County Houston
C. N. Dist., 158 F.2d 861, 865 (5th Cir. 1946).
31 Phillips v. United States, 243 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1957).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City, Kan., 159 F.2d 125, 129 (10th Cir.
1946).
33 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); Harwell v. United States, 316
F.2d 791, 793 (10th Cir. 1963). In United States v. Kansas City, Kan.,
supra note 32, the court stated: "The use being a public one, the quantity
which should be taken ... and the extent or sort of the estate to be acquired
... are legislative questions and are not subject to judicial review. The de-
cision of the officer designated to enforce the legislative will is also immune
from judicial review. The court below, therefore, was in error in intervening
to decree a different estate than the one determined as necessary by such
designated officer."
34 Berman v. Parker, supra note 33.
35 McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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eminent domain as exercised by the United States is no more than
the means to a Congressionally established end,36 and of necessity
it is the object or ostensible public purpose for which the acquisi-
tion will ultimately be devoted which raises the traditional consti-
tutional questions-not the acquisition itself. Therefore, the result-
ant scope of judicial review is limited, because "the nature of the
subject matter gives the legislative determination nearly immunity
from judicial review .... 37
As a practical matter, the necessary legislative authorization for
a particular judicial taking will be found in the declaration of tak-
ing or the complaint in condemnation. It is required by Congress if
the proceeding is commenced under the Declaration of Taking
Act.3 s If the proceeding is instituted without application of the Dec-
laration of Taking Act, the practice is to include the legislative
authority in the complaint in condemnation. It must be understood,
however, that the Declaration of Taking Act is by no means ex-
clusive and other methods are available by which the United States
may take and condemn property 9 The Declaration of Taking Act
is merely a more orderly alternative to physical seizure.4 0
III. WHAT LAW CONTROLS?
The exercise of the power of eminent domain by the United
States is, as it must be, a federal matter and involves essential fed-
eral questions. As mentioned, it had early been the practice to in-
stitute federal condemnation actions in state courts and apply state
standards even though there was no Congressional mandate to do
36 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
37 United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 557 (1946) (concur-
ring opinion).
3846 Stat. 1421 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1958).
39 United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958), where the Supreme Court
stated: "Broadly speaking, the United States may take property pursuant
to its power of eminent domain in one of two ways: it can enter into
physical possession of property without authority of a court order; or it
can institute condemnation proceedings under various Acts of Congress
providing authority for such takings. Under the first method - physical
seizure - no condemnation proceedings are instituted, and the property
owner is provided a remedy under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a) (2)
and 1491, to recover just compensation. See Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S.
95, 104. Under the second procedure the Government may either employ
statutes which require it to pay over the judicially determined compensa-
tion before it can enter upon the land, Act of August 1, 1888, 25 Stat.
357, 40 U.S.C. § 257; Act of August 18, 1890, 26 Stat. 316, 50 U.S.C. § 171,
or proceed under other statutes which enable it to take immediate posses-
sion upon order of court before the amount of just compensation has been
ascertained. Act of July 18, 1918, 40 Stat. 904, 911, 33 U.S.C. § 594; Title
II of the Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942, 56 Stat. 176, 177
(employed by the Government in the present case)."
40 Id. at 22.
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so. In Kohl v. United States,41 the Supreme Court disposed of any
notion that this early practice was necessary:
It has not been seriously contended during the argument
that the United States government is without power to ap-
propriate lands or other property within the States for its
own uses, and to enable it to perform its proper functions.
Such an authority is essential to its independent existence
and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved if the obstin-
ancy of a private person, or if any other authority, can pre-
vent the acquisition of the means or instruments by which
alone governmental functions can be performed. The pow-
ers vested by the Constitution in the general government
demand for their exercise the acquisition of lands in all
the States. These are needed for forts, armories, and arsen-
als, for navy-yards and light-houses, for custom-houses,
post-offices and court-houses, and for other public uses. If
the right to acquire property for such uses may be made
a barren right by the unwillingness of property-holders
to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to the
Federal government, the constitutional grants of power
may be rendered nugatory, and the government is depend-
ent for its practical existence upon the will of a State, or
even upon that of a private citizen. This cannot be. No one
doubts the existence in the State governments of the right
of eminent domain,-a right distinct from and paramount
to the right of ultimate ownership. It grows out of the nec-
essities of their being, not out of the tenure by which lands
are held. It may be exercised, though the lands are not held
by grant from the government, either mediately or immedi-
ately, and independent of the consideration whether they
would escheat to the government in case of a failure of
heirs. The right is the offspring of political necessity; and
it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied it by its
fundamental law .... But it is no more necessary for the
exercise of the powers of a State government than it is for
the exercise of the conceded powers of the Federal govern-
ment. That government is as sovereign within its sphere as
the States are within theirs. True, its sphere is limited. Cer-
tain subjects only are committed to it; but its power over
those subjects is as full and complete as is the power of the
41 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
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States over the subjects to which their sovereignty ex-
tends ....
If the United States have the power, it must be com-
plete in itself. It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by
a State. Nor can any State prescribe the manner in which
it must be exercised. The consent of a State can never be
a condition precedent to its enjoyment.
4 2
The federal nature of the power of eminent domain as exer-
cised by the United States now affects both substantive and pro-
cedural aspects of federal condemnation actions. 43 The effect of the
heretofore applicable local conformity requirements 44 was to chan-
nel the distinctively federal power into forty-eight distinct, diver-
gent applications. Ostensibly the requirements affected only the
procedural aspects of federal condemnation actions, but while the
divorce between procedure and substance may be academically
complete, a careful reading of the decisions antedating Rule 71A
discloses nuances of state law interwoven in the federal context. 45
It is now recognized that the exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the United States involves essential federal functions
and interests, and state law has no overriding application to the
detriment of federal standards and principles unless Congress
chooses to make state law applicable.46 Moreover, federal law con-
trols the construction of instruments by which the United States
acquires title to property.47 Because of the federal nature of the
power of eminent domain as exercised by the United States, the oft-
quoted, contextually distorted, dictum of Mr. Justice Brandeis that
"there is no federal general common law ... ",48 can find no prop-
er application in federal condemnation actions. '
No different result is indicated by the language in United
421d. at 371 and 374.
43 United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. 328, 333 n. 7 (1959)
United States v. Featherston, 325 F.2d 539, 542 (10th Cir. 1963) (affect-
ing the now applicable procedural rules since the adoption of Rule 71A,
Fed. R. Civ. P.) ; compare United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 379 (1943) ;
Comparet v. United States, 164 F.2d 452, 453 (10th Cir. 1947) (affecting
substantive aspects prior to the adoption of Rule 71A, Fed. R. Civ. P.).
44 Act of August 1, 1888, Ch. 728, § 2, 25 Stat. 357.
45 See, e.g., United States v. Theimer, 199 F.2d 501, 502 (10th Cir. 1952).
46 United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. 328, 332 (1959) ; see also
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943); Lyeth v.
Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193 (1938).
47 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 182 (1944).
48 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
49 Ibid. from a standpoint of context, Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement was
predicated as follows: "Third. Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Act of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is
the law of the State."
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States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson,50 in which the Supreme Court
stated: "Though the meaning of 'property' as used in § 25 of the
[T.V.A.] Act and in the Fifth Amendment is a federal question, it
will normally obtain its content by reference to local law."51 The
premise is echoed in United States v. Causby,52 in which Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas speaking for the Court said, "[T] he meaning of 'pro-
perty' . . . [is] a federal question, 'it will normally obtain its con-
tent by reference to local law.'-53 Referring to this same question,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit said, "This does not
mean, however, that every local idiosyncrasy or artificiality in a
state's concepts, or the incidents thereof, necessarily will be accekt-
ed."
54
A reference to local law is proper to determine the relative
rights among the several condemnees in a given condemnation ac-
tion-either the extent of a party's rights or one condemnee's re-
lationship to another. 55 However, it is appropriate to depart from
concepts of local law when essential federal interests and functions
are involved and where an adherence to local concepts would work
a result contrary to federal law.56 One example of the foregoing
arises with the consideration of future interests. Future interests
may be recognized and fully enforceable within the jurisdiction
where created. However, the holder of such an interest may share
in an award of just compensation only if the event upon which the
interest is conditioned is imminent and will occur within a rela-
tively short period of time 7 In those instances where the prospec-
tive interest was remote and speculative, although legally recogniz-
able and enforceable in a state forum, federal courts have declined
to permit such speculative interests to share in awards of just com-
pensation.5
8
50319 U.S. 266 (1943).
5
1 1d. at 279.
52 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
53 Id. at 266.
54 Nebraska v. United States, 164 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 815 (1947).
55 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 374 (1946), rev'g, 147 F.
2d 912 (10th Cir. 1945).
56 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 379 (1943) ; compare United States
v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 264 F.2d 112, 117 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 819 (1959).
57 United States v. 2184.81 Acres in Sebastian, Crawford and Franklin Coun-
ties, 45 F.Supp. 681, 684 (W.D. Ark. 1942); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §
53, comment c (1936).
58 Woodville v. United States, 152 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 842 (1946); United States v. 16 Acres in Village of Hyannis, 47
F.Supp. 603, 604 (D. Mass. 1942) ; United States v. 2086 Acres in Spartan-
burg County, 46 F.Supp. 411, 412 (W.D. S.C. 1942); RESTATEMENT, PROP-
ERTY § 53, comment b (1936) ; see Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1181 (1949).
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IV. DISTINCTION BETWEEN "TAKING" AND "DAMAGE"
A particularly important reason for the emphasis that the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain by the United States is a fed-
eral question can be found in a comparison of the respective guar-
antees found in the Constitution of the United States and many of
the state constitutions. The fifth amendment provides: "[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation. '5 9 Contrasted with the federal guarantee is the provision of
the Constitution of the state of Colorado, which states, "Private
property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use,
without just compensation.""," Colorado is not unique in providing
for just compensation for "taking and damage." 1
The distinction between the respective sovereign guarantees is
important and real, not a matter of mere verbiage. An indication of
the distinction can be found in Transportation Co. v. Chicago,
62
in which the Supreme Court early had an opportunity to consider
the noncompensatory aspects of governmental activities. The Trans-
portation Co. decision arose out of an action brought to recover
damages for the necessary use of alternate docking facilities and
the cracking, settling, and falling of walls caused by an under-river
tunnel excavation by the City of Chicago. The Court stated:
The remedy, therefore, for a consequential injury resulting
from the State's action through its agents, if there be any,
must be that, and that only, which the legislature shall
give. It does not exist at common law. The decisions to
which we have referred were made in view of Magna Char-
ta and the restrictions to be found in the constitution of
every State, that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation being made. But acts
done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and
not directly encroaching upon private property, though
their consequences may impair its use, are universally held
not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional
provision. They do not entitle the owner of such property
to compensation from the State or its agents, or give him
any right of action. This is supported by an immense weight
of authority.
6 3
This decision is the first clear pronouncement by the Supreme
59 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (Emphasis supplied.)
60 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15. (Emphasis supplied.)
61 For a compilation of states with "taking and damage" provisions, see 2
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1[11 (3d ed. 1950).
62 99 U.S. 635 (1878).
63 Id. at 641.
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Court of what might be described as the physical invasion concept.
The requirement that the property allegedly affected be subjected
to a physical invasion, or something tantamount thereto, in order
to constitute a taking permeates subsequent decisions.
More recently, the Supreme Court has considered two other
cases which, although directly dealing with the so-called naviga-
tional servitude, tend to illustrate the principle that damage alone
is not commensurate with a taking within the meaning of the fifth
amendment, absent a direct physical invasion and surrender of the
property right allegedly taken.6 4 In United States v. Willow River
Power Co., the limitation of the guarantee of just compensation for
takings was explained as follows:
The Fifth Amendment, which requires just compensa-
tion where private property is taken for public use, under-
takes to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by
public improvements so that they will fall upon the public
rather than wholly upon those who happen to lie in the
path of the project. It does not undertake, however, to
socialize all losses, but those only which result from a tak-
ing of property. If damages from any other cause are to be
absorbed by the public, they must be assumed by act of
Congress and may not be awarded by the courts merely by
implication from the constitutional provision.65
The task of distinguishing between damage and taking in the
eminent domain context arises time after time. In Bedford v. United
States, 66 the Supreme Court said, "The Constitution provides that
private property shall not be taken without just compensation, but
a distinction has been made between damage and taking, and that
distinction must be observed in applying the constitutional provi-
sion. '67 All states in the Tenth Circuit, except Kansas, have consti-
tutional provisions with respect to damage and taking similar to
that of the state of Colorado. 6 Efforts to enlarge the more narrow
federal guarantee to a breadth paralleling state guarantees have
been rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In
Batten v. United States,69 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit had occasion to consider an action brought under the Tucker
Act, 7 by homeowners adjacent to an Air Force base for greater
64 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) ; United
States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945).
65 United States v. Willow River Power Co., supra note 64 at 502.
66 192 U.S. 217 (1904).
67 Id. at 224.
68 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 584 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S 955 (1963).69 Supra note 68
7028 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1958).
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and increased noise by larger and noisier military jet aircraft than
those operated in the past. The homeowners argued that the later-
ally traveling noise was so great as to be tantamount to a taking,
thus compensable under the principles of United States v. Causby.
71
The court in Batten, perhaps motivated in part by the realization
of the extreme difficulties of application, declined to extend the
principles relating to low and frequent overflight to laterally trav-
eling noise. Judge Breitenstein, speaking for the court, observed:
Because of this rule which denies the recovery of conse-
quential damages in the absence of any taking, many state
constitutions provide in substance that private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without com-
pensation .... However, the federal obligation has not been
so enlarged either by statute or constitutional amendment.
7 2
A further ramification of what has been described as the phys-
ical invasion concept, together with implications of the "unity" re-
quirement,73 was recently considered by the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in Stipe v. United States."4 In Stipe the United
States brought two condemnation actions in connection with the
Eufaula Dam and Reservoir project in Oklahoma, which required a
highway relocation. The condemnee owned and operated a truck
stop, gas station and restaurant. The effect of the highway reloca-
tion was to elevate the new roadway and make more difficult get-
ting to and from the condemnee's roadside business. The court
stated:
The rule is that when there is a taking of part of a tract
of land, just compensation shall include damages to the re-
maining land caused by the taking .... Accordingly, Stipe
urges that the decrease in the market value of his property
was caused by the condemnation of only part of his land.
However, the evidence establishes that none of the proper-
71328 U.S. 256 (1946).
72 Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 955 (1963) ; see also Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640, 645
(Ct. Cl. 1964); compare United States v. 3276.21 Acres (Miramar), 222
F.Supp. 887 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
73 An early consideration of the "unity" requirement can be found in Sharpe
v. United States, 112 Fed. 893, 896 (3d Cir. 1902), aff'd, 191 U.S. 341
(1903), where the court of appeals stated: ". . . Depreciation in the value
of the residue of such a tract may properly be considered as allowable dam-
ages in adjusting the compensation to be given to the owner for the land
taken. It is often difficult, when part of a tract is taken, to determine what
is a distinct and independent tract; but the character of the holding, and the
distinction between a residue of a tract whose integrity is destroyed by
the taking and what are merely other parcels or holdings of the same own-
er, must be kept in mind in the practical application of the requirement tn
render just compensation for property taken for public uses."
74 337 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1964).
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ty upon which the business was located, or at least none
that materially affected the business, was taken. Although
perhaps not as desirable or convenient as it was before,
access was provided to the relocated and changed high-
ways. The record as a whole discloses beyond any doubt
that the decrease in the value of the business resulted not
from the taking of part of Stipe's land, but from the reloca-
tion of Highway 69, which diverted traffic over the high-
way away from the business operation. Whatever his loss,
it is due to the destruction or frustration of his business,
and not the taking of the property. Such losses are not
compensable.
7 5
In addition to the physical invasion concept, there is authority
that the condemnee can be awarded just compensation only for
loss which is peculiar or different from that of other property own-
ers in the vicinity, a distinction roughly analogous to the distinc-
tion between public and private nuisance. Thus, in Richards v.
Washington Terminal Co. 76 it was held that liability for a taking
existed as a result of accumulated gases and smoke from railroad
engines in a tunnel, which were exhausted over plaintiff's property
by a fanning system. Recovery was denied for resultant alleged
damages which were due to the normal operations of the railroad.
The Supreme Court stated:
Any diminution of the value of property not directly in-
vaded nor peculiarly affected, but sharing in the common
burden of incidental damages arising from the legalized
nuisance, is held not to be a "taking" within the constitu-
tional provision. The immunity is limited to such damages
as naturally and unavoidably result from the proper con-
duct of the road and are shared generally by property own-
ers whose lands lie within range of the inconveniences
necessarily incident to proximity to a railroad. It includes
the noises and vibrations incident to the running of trains,
the necessary emission of smoke and sparks from the loco-
motives, and similar annoyances inseparable from the nor-
mal and non-negligent operation of a railroad. 7
7
A perhaps extreme example of an application of the foregoing
principle is found in Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 7
which involved a claim for "consequential damages," probably tort-
like in character, as distinguished from a taking within the judicial
75 Id. at 821.
76233 U.S. 546 (1914).
77 Id. at 554.
78132 F.Supp. 707 (Ct. C1. 1955).
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parlance of the fifth amendment. During the course of construction
at the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington, the United States caused
the contamination of spring water by pumping water into a lake
which then overflowed after heavy rains, flooding the landowner's
springs. The Court of Claims stated:
To constitute a taking, the overflow of or seepage into the
spring must have been the direct, natural or probable result
of an authorized activity and not the incidental or conse-
quential injury inflicted by the action .... A tort action
may lie in the proper forum for such an incidental or conse-
quential injury, but not a suit for just compensation. There
must have been an intent on the part of the defendant
[United States] to take plaintiff's property or an intention
to do an act the natural consequence of which was to take
its property.
79
The court pointed out that in no case has the Supreme Court
ever indicated that an accidental or negligent impairment of the
value of property constituted a taking within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.,0 One fundamental consideration is not entirely
clear from the text of the opinion, and that is whether the injury
complained of was permanent or merely temporary, not likely to
reoccur. If the injury involved only a single instance and was only
temporary in duration, the tort-like acts are readily distinguishable
from a taking. However, if the injury complained of was perman-
ent and inroads had been made upon the landowner's ownership,
the court's decision is questionable and certainly contrary to better
reasoned authority
81
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has also considered
the limited aspects of a taking arising out of tortious circumstances.
In Harris v. United States,82 an abutting landowner sought recovery
against the United States for allegedly negligent aerial spraying;
the spray drifted over from federally owned lands onto abutting
lands and damaged growing crops. After the court determined the
acts of the United States to be discretionary in nature and an ex-
press exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act sa the court went on
to reject the argument that such acts constituted a taking:
A compensable taking under the federal constitution,
like the phrase "just compensation" is not capable of pre-
cise definition. And the adjudicated cases have steered a
79 Id. at 709.
SId. at 710.
81 See Gerlach Livestock Co. v. United States, 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
82205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
83Id. at 766.
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rather uneven course between a tortious act for which the
sovereign is immune except insofar as it has expressly
consented to be liable, and those acts amounting to an im-
position of a servitude for which the constitution implies a
promise to justly compensate. Generally it is held that a
single destructive act without a deliberate intent to assert
or acquire a proprietary interest or dominion is tortious and
within the rule of immunity.
84
In United States v. Dickinson,85 the Supreme Court stated, "Prop-
erty is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made
upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private par-
ties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in the
course of time.86 Earlier, the Supreme Court in United States v.
General Motors Corp.,87 described the nature of a taking as follows:
In its primary meaning, the term "taken" would seem to
signify something more than destruction, for it might well
be claimed that one does not take what he destroys. But
the construction of the phrase has not been so narrow. The
courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner
rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sover-
eign constitutes the taking. Governmental action short of
acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its ef-
fects are so complete to deprive the owner of all or most
of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a taking
But it is to be observed that whether the sovereign sub-
stitutes itself as occupant in place of the former owner, or
destroys all his existing rights in the subject matter, the
Fifth Amendment concerns itself solely with the "proper-
ty," i.e., with the owner's relation as such to the physical
thing and not with other collateral interests which may be
incident to his ownership. 88
In the overall context of monetary amenability of the United
States, it is hardly accidental that Congress has specifically pro-
vided redress for certain tortious injury or damage within the
framework of the Federal Tort Claims Act" on the one hand, while
on the other failing to take cognizance of the judicial refinement
of the concept of taking. This can be contrasted with analogous cir-
84 Id. at 767.
85331 U.S. 745 (1947).
86Id. at 748.
87 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
88Id. at 378.
8928 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
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cumstances on the state level. For example, there is no provision
for recovery for tortious conduct committed by the state of Colo-
rado except by private bill. In those instances where tort-like dam-
age accompanies an exercise of the power of eminent domain at the
state level, the argument for providing redress for all apparent
claims, taking and damage, when coupled with the apparent
breadth of state constitutional guarantees in this area, becomes
quite compelling.
One example of the restrictive scope of federal condemnation
actions is found in situations involving aviation "clearance" ease-
ment actions as distinguished from "avigation" easement takings.
The so-called clearance easements are frequently the subject of af-
firmative judicial action instituted by the United States. They
are usually taken for the purpose of securing an unobstructed
line -of -sight for aircraft approaches to an airport or an air-
base and to eliminate both natural and artificial obstructions and
hazards. On the other hand, an avigation easement is the usufructu-
ary aspect of the airspace above the surface of the land to fly air-
craft at low altitudes over the surface, principally when landing and
taking off. Under the rather rigid interpretation of the nature of
a clearance easement as set forth by the condemning authority in its
pleadings, it has been held that the acquisition of a clearance ease-
ment does not include the right to fly aircraft over the land affect-
ed.90 While the fact of condemning a clearance easement does not
carry with it usufructuary rights to the airspace, avigational usage
tantamount to a taking may and frequently does occur - an "in-
verse" condemnation. When the overflights are so frequent and so
proximate as to constitute a permanent deprivation of the airspace
attendant to and necessary for beneficial usage of the surface es-
tate, a taking occurs, such as in the now classic decision in United
States v. Causby.91 When a property owner is subjected to an in-
verse taking of his property, Congress has specifically provided a
remedy under the Tucker Act.9 2 Because of the monetary jurisdic-
tional limitations placed upon the district courts most inverse tak-
90 United States v. Brondum, 272 F.2d 642, 646 (5th Cir. 1959) ; United
States v. 4.43 Acres in Tarrant County, 137 F.Supp. 567, 572 (N.D. Tex.
1956).
91328 U.S. 256 (1946).
9228 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958), provides in part: "(a) The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of: . . .
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceed-
ing $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." See 28 U.S.C. § 1471
(1958).
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ings of any consequence are instituted in the Court of Claims. In
every instance, however, it is fundamental that the court determine,
as a matter of law, that a taking has occurred by the acts com-
plained of; if a taking has occurred the nature of the estate so taken
should be capable of legal definition. 93 In instances involving aviga-
tion easements, the principles announced in Causby must be fully
met.
9 4
It would seem as a matter of factual consequence that no single
occurrence is more probable from an overt taking of a clearance
easement than the ultimate fact of overflight. Nevertheless it is
abundantly clear that overflight, per se, is not tantamount to a
taking within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life,
and the inconveniences which it causes are normally not
compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The airspace,
apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part
of the public domain. We need not determine at this time
what those precise limits are. Flights over private land are
not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to
be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment
and use of the land.9 5
The result in Causby, it is submitted, is little more than the coming
of age of the principles announced in Richards v. Washington Ter-
minal Co. 96 The advent of the air-age has brought with it nuisance
and annoyance. But many of the disagreeable features of the rail-
road and aircraft are burdens shared by the public in common and
not actionable as takings other than in exceptional circumstances.
93 See United States v. Wald, 330 F.2d 871, 872 (10th Cir. 1964), an action
originally predicated under the Tort Claims Act was amended to comport
with the Tucker Act for an alleged inverse condemnation, wherein Judge
Breitenstein succinctly stated: "When the United States takes property
for public use and without just compensation as required by the Fifth
Amendment, the owner may sue under the Tucker Act. In such suit con-
sequential damages are not enough to sustain a recovery. An actual taking
must be established . . . The suit is in effect a condemnation action in re-
verse. The interest taken by the United States must be defined with preci-
sion . . . The judgments [of the lower court] do not purport to define the
property taken. This alone requires reversal."
94 Compare Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963). At first blush, there would appear to be little,
if any, distinction between low and frequent aircraft overflight and later-
ally traveling aircraft noise. This is true only so far as the noise itself is
concerned. Analytically, however, the noise aspect is but a single feature
of the Court's decision in Causby where there was an actual, frequent
invasion and usage of that which was necessary for the use of the property
in question, to say nothing of the relative dangers in each instance or the
manifest difficulty of application of a concept of taking predicated upon
laterally traveling noise.
95 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
96233 U.S. 546 (1914).
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Somewhat the same annoyance and general public burden may be
found in the modern, high speed highways.
V. THE MEANING OF "JUST COMPENSATION"
In the final analysis, the question of fundamental importance
so far as the condemnee is concerned is the determination of, and
what constitutes, just compensation. Perhaps fortunately, the fifth
amendment undertakes only to guarantee just compensation to a
property owner without attempting to set down any static, inflex-
ible definition. By a use of synonyms the Supreme Court has var-
iously described the just compensation to which a condemnee is
entitled, for example, "value, '9 7 "market value,"' s and "current
market value."99 At least one text authority has indicated a de-
scriptive preference for "fair market value."100 However, the Su-
preme Court has voiced the opinion that the term "fair" hardly adds
anything in a descriptive sense."' 1 It should be fundamental that
the concept of fairness inure in every aspect of the fifth amendment
as a matter of principle.
The Supreme Court has been careful to avoid any unqualified
endorsement of a single standard measuring just compensation. In
United States v. Cors,1° '-' the Court stated:
The Court in its construction of the constitutional provi-
sion has been careful not to reduce the concept of "just
compensation" to a formula. The political ethics reflected in
the Fifth Amendment reject confiscation as a measure of
justice. But the Amendment does not contain any definite
standards of fairness by which the measure of "just com-
pensation" is to be determined .... The Court in an endea-
vor to find working rules that will do substantial justice
has adopted practical standards, including that of market
value .... But it has refused to make a fetish even of mar-
ket value, since that may not be the best measure of value
in some cases.10 3
Other language by the Supreme Court would suggest that the mar-
ket value standard may be subject to some variance at least in ex-
traordinary situations. However, in those cases which have reached
the Court, it has not had occasion to approve a measure of just
compensation other than market value. Despite the foregoing quot-
97 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897).9 8 United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923).
99 United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 126 (1950).
100 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 17 (2d ed. 1953).
101 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
102 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
103 Id. at 332.
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ed statement, the Court in Cors chose not to reject the market
value standard when compensating an owner for the war-time re-
quisitioning of his steam tug. What the Court did reject was a
market value influenced by spiraling war-time prices.
It is not fair that the government be required to pay the
enhanced price which its [war-time] demand alone has
created. That enhancement reflects elements of the value
that was created by the urgency of its need for the article.
It does not reflect what "a willing buyer would pay in cash
to a willing seller" . . . in a fair market. It represents what
can be exacted from the government whose demands in
the emergency have created a sellers' market. In this situa-
tion, as in the case of land included in a proposed project
of the government, the enhanced value reflects speculation
as to what the government can be compelled to pay. That
is a hold-up value, not a fair market value. That is a value
which the government itself created and hence in fairness
should not be required to pay.1 0 4
An exception to the market value standard which has received
approval by the courts of appeal and district courts can be found in
those decisions involving publicly owned facilities such as streets,
roads, sewers, and water mains, and quasi-publicly owned facilities
such as telephone and power lines. The just compensation in these
instances is the reasonable cost of providing replacement facilities
equal in necessary utility.10° The logic of a replacement approach
in such instances is readily apparent. There is no general market
for items such as publicly owned streets, sewers and the like. Such
things are not commonly bought and sold on the open market, and
such public or quasi-public services have bilateral obligatory con-
sequences of service and utility which simply cannot be measured
by the ordinary market standard. A replacement cost in such in-
stances is conditioned upon the necessity of the public body to pro-
vide a replacement, and if the necessity to replace does not exist
there is no obligation on the condemnor to compensate. 10 6
The refusal of the Supreme Court to attach iconic adherence to
the market value standard is significant when one realizes that it
is entirely possible to be confronted with a condemnation and no
market whatsoever. Had the Court established market value as the
104 Id. at 333.
105 Fort Worth v. United States, 188 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1951); United
States v. City of New York, 168 F.2d 387, 389 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Woodville
v. United States, 152 F.2d 735, 736 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 842
(1946); United States v. Des Moines County, Iowa, 148 F.2d 448, 449
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743 (1945).
106 Woodville v. United States, supra note 105 at 737.
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single standard it is a simple matter to anticipate the argument of
a condemning authority in instances where market data does not
exist. The argument would be to the effect that the absence of
market values indicates a lack of compensable value in the property
condemned. In effect, such an argument would severely penalize
uniqueness and types of property infrequently bought and sold. On
the other hand, a departure from the market value aproach is hard-
ly justified in those instances where an alternate measure of value
would simply tend to prove a higher dollar result.
10 7
There have been many instances where ascertainment of mar-
ket value was fraught with difficulty, nevertheless, market value
was the standard applied by the Supreme Court. 08 In Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States,10 9 an action involving the condemna-
tion of an Omaha, Nebraska, laundry for an annual period during
war-time and renewable at the option and discretion of the Secre-
tary of War, the Supreme Court stated:
As Mr. Justice Brandeis observed, "Value is a word of
many meanings."..... For purposes of the compensation due
under the Fifth Amendment, of course, only that "value"
need be considered which is attached to "property" . . . but
that only approaches by one step the problem of definition.
The value of property springs from subjective needs and
attitudes; its value to the owner may therefore differ wide-
ly from its value to the taker. Most things, however, have
a general demand which gives them a value transferable
from one owner to another. As opposed to such personal
and variant standards as value to the particular owner
whose property has been taken, this transferable value has
an external validity which makes it a fair measure of public
obligation to compensate the loss incurred by an owner as
1OT In United States v. Merchants Matrix Cut Syndicate, 219 F.2d 90, 98
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955), the court said: "All too
frequently, profit seeking motives creep into condemnation cases. This ob-
servation, no doubt, will be distasteful to those who envisage the public
treasury as fair game in such proceedings. Though competitive existence
in our society may stimulate such desires, just compensation, only, remains
the yardstick in eminent domain proceedings."
108 Toronto Nav. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 396 (1949) (valuation of
antiquated Great Lake coal collier requisitioned for war-time use) ; Kim-
ball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (valuation of con-
demned annual lease of Omaha, Nebraska laundry); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (valuation of commercial building
taken for temporary war-time use) ; United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (valuation of unexpired term of leasehold
interest taken for war-time use) ; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States,
265 U.S. 106 (1924) (valuation of partially completed maritime vessel
requisitioned for war-time use); Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262
U.S. 337 (1923) (valuation of copper requisitioned far war-time use).
109 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
a result of the taking of his property for public use. In
view, however, of the liability of all property to condemna-
tion for the common good, loss to the owner of nontransfer-
able values deriving from his unique need for property or
idiosyncratic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise
of the police power, is properly treated as part of the bur-
den of common citizenship .... Because gain to the taker,
on the other hand, may be wholly unrelated to the depriva-
tion imposed upon the owner, it must also be rejected as a
measure of public obligation to requite for that depriva-
tion....
The value compensable under the Fifth Amendment,
therefore, is only that value which is capable of trans-
fer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some
equivalent. Its measure is the amount of that equivalent.
But since a transfer brought about by eminent domain is
not a voluntary exchange, this amount can be determined
only by a guess, as well informed as possible, as to what
the equivalent would probably have been had a voluntary
exchange taken place. If exchanges of similar property have
been frequent, the inference is strong that the equivalent
arrived at by the haggling of the market would probably
have been offered and accepted, and it is thus that the
"market price" becomes so important a standard of refer-
ence. . . . But when the property is of a kind seldom ex-
changed, it has no "market price," and then recourse must
be had to other means of ascertaining value, including even
value to the owner as indicative of value to other potential
owners enjoying the same rights .... These considerations
have special relevance where "property" is "taken" not in
fee but for an indeterminate period.110
In Olson v. United States,1 1' an action to condemn lands for
flowage easements and reservoir purposes, the several condemnees
argued that if their property was particularly adaptable to such
uses they were entitled to have such adaptability considered as en-
hancing the value of the property taken in the determination of
just compensation. In a most comprehensive decision, the Supreme
Court disclosed how such special adaptability should be treated:
Just compensation includes all elements of value that in-
here in the property, but it does not exceed market value
fairly determined. The sum required to be paid the owner
11o Id. at 4.
111 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
VOL. XLI
FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
does not depend upon the uses to which he has devoted his
land but is to be arrived at upon just consideration of all
the uses for which is is suitable. The highest and most pro-
fitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed
or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to
be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but
to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use
affects the market value while the property is privately
held.
1 12
The Appellate Section of the Lands Division, Department of
Justice, has amassed considerable precedent in its favor which has
had the net effect of substantial monetary savings to the general
public. Unlike the average condemnee, the Department of Justice
has the decided advantage of monitoring all federal condemnation
actions which are filed and tried on behalf of the United States.
One major consequence of this facility is an excellent opportunity
to select the more favorable judicial vehicles to appeal. This selec-
tion process, coupled with the resources of considerable appellate
experience, places the Department of Justice in an advantageous
position which few condemnees can hope to duplicate. The result
is the rather conservative approach of many of the opinions touch-
ing upon this area. One counterbalancing consideration exists in
those instances in which the condemnee selects the appeal. In such
instances the advantage usually enjoyed by the United States as
appellant can, occasionally, be reversed. The consideration of ap-
pellate experience is another matter.
One of the more inequitable principles which has developed is
the so-called "Miller Rule,"' 13 which is a disallowance of any value
increment to the condemnee's property attributable to the enhanc-
ing features of the particular project. The Supreme Court's impor-
tant decision in United States v. Miller, 14 arose out of an attempt
by promoters to obtain handsome profits by speculating with pro-
perty in the path of a large federal project, which property would
eventually be required by and condemned as part of the project it-
self. Few will quarrel with a result that thwarts efforts to speculate
at the expense of the public purse. The Court stated:
The question then is whether the respondents' lands
were probably within the scope of the project from the
time the Government was committed to it. If they were not,
but were merely adjacent lands, the subsequent enlarge-
112 Id. at 254.
113 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
114 Ibid.
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ment of the project to include them ought not to deprive
the respondents of the value added in the meantime by the
proximity of the improvement. If, on the other hand, they
were, the Government ought not to pay any increase in
value arising from the known fact that the lands probably
would be condemned. The owners ought not to gain by
speculating on probable increase in value due to the Gov-
ernment's activities.115
A broad application of the rationale announced in Miller can
result in as much mischief as it can in solution of the existent in-
equities which it sought to cure. In the first instance, the Court as-
sumes the ability of valuation experts to accurately segregate from
their opinions and available market data that facet of value attri-
butable to the project. This assumption seemingly contradicts the
Court's statement in the same opinion that such expert valuation
testimony is, "at best, a guess by informed persons." 116 If experts
are capable at all of measuring and segregating such nuances of
value as enhancement due to the project, it is submitted that the
difficulty is compounded by the fact that real estate values are con-
stantly increasing and have been increasing over the years since
the depression of the 1930's. Presumably, the Court would allow the
landowner the benefit of this natural increment, although those who
venture an opinion as to valuation must separate this occurrence
from the phenomenon of the particular federal project.
Another inequity results when a project has been announced
and several years intervene between announcement and taking
Assuming the condemnee wishes to relocate in the same general
area, which is frequently the case in rural areas and when the con-
demnee has spent his entire life in a particular place, the ensuing
interval of time has the effect of increasing other property values,
whereas the condemnee is faced with the prospect of receiving no
more than pre-project value for his property. The interval of time
creates an unfair hiatus. To compensate a condemnee at a pre-
project price level and expect him to replace his property at a
higher figure is arguably unfair. Increases in property values due to
a particular project correspond, in part, to the amount of land
required for the project as a whole. The more land required, the
more is removed from the otherwise available market, consequently
the supply decreases and the simple economics of supply and de-
mand take effect to make relocation more difficult.
A final inequity which occurs is that the only persons who
115 Id. at 377.
116 Id. at 375. (Emphasis added.)
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suffer from a taking are those whose property is taken. On the one
hand those persons who own property in the same general area but
are not deprived of it have the full benefit of any increment in
value attributable to the project. On the other hand, those persons
whose lands lie in the path of the project are made less than whole.
VI. THE VALUATION PROCESS
When a condemnation action takes for public use an entire
ownership, the process of determining just compensation is com-
paratively simple. Essentially, the valuation process involves an
ascertainment of the condemned property's "highest and best
use"'117 and the application of measurable market data reflecting
this use to the property condemned. A more difficult situation is
encountered in partial takings, those situations in which either the
land condemned or the estate taken is less than the entire owner-
ship. In United States v. Miller,"" the Supreme Court suggested the
difficulty in the following comment:
If only a portion of a single tract is taken, the owner's com-
pensation for that taking includes any element of value
arising out of the relation of the part taken to the entire
tract .... Such damage is often, though somewhat loosely,
spoken of as severance damage.19
The fundamental basis of a claim for severance damage is a dimi-
nution in the market value of the property remaining after the
taking.120 The concept of severance damage is merely a breakdown
of one facet of the valuation process. Severance damage is the
diminution in market value of the property remaining. However,
perhaps by virtue of the descriptive nature of the term itself, the
allowance of compensation for severance damage seemingly fosters
notions that consequential, incidental and other damages unrelated
to judicially established principles of just compensation may be
injected into the trial of the issue of just compensation.
One commentator has suggested that there are three basic
approaches to the valuation process: (1) "'Damages to the Remain-
der' Included in the 'Value of the Part Taken,' ",121 (2) "Value of
the Part Taken Plus Damages to the Remainder," 122 and (3) "Dif-
ference between the Fair Market Value of the Property before and
after the Taking.' 23 Seemingly, the first approach has found little,
117 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
118 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
119 Id. at 376.
120 Cole Investment Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1958).
121 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 49 (2d ed. 1953).
122 Id. § 50.
123 Id. § 51.
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if any, acceptance. The second and third approaches are quite di-
verse and have distinctive nuances which are more than a matter
of mere semantics.
The second approach, the "value of the part taken plus dam-
ages to the remainder," would appear to find logical application in
those jurisdictions where the constitutional guarantee provides just
compensation for property "taken or damaged. '124 This approach is
established by statute in the state of Colorado. 125 Nowhere is appli-
cability more clear than in the so-called Cities and Towns Act 1 26
which provides, in part:
The jury shall return a special verdict fixing and determin-
ing the damages or compensation to be allowed to each
defendant, severally, who has demanded such jury trial,
which verdict shall include both the fair, actual cash mar-
ket value of the land actually taken for the improvement,
and also the direct, fair and actual damage, if any, caused
on account of said improvement to property not taken for
the improvement.
The principal objection to this approach, at least in a federal
context, is that the statutory valuation process emphasizes the sub-
jective element of damage-an indemnity approach-which is not
protected within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Also, the
compensation to be awarded the several, varied interests which may
exist is made a principal quest in the jury's determination, rather
than an ancillary aspect of the proceedings as in federal condem-
nation actions. In a federal context, the objective market value
standard is the criterion of valuation, or "[i] n other words, there is
no severance damage if the market value of the land remaining is
the same."
127
It would appear that the "before and after" approach to valua-
tion is more properly suited to the determination of just compen-
sation in federal eminent domain proceedings. Early, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Grizzard12 1 gave its approval to a before
and after approach, stating:
That the trial judge found the damages for the land and
for the easement of access separately is not controlling. The
124 E.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
125 COLO. REV. STAT. § 50-1-18 (1963), which provides, in part: [T]he verdict
of the jury shall state: . . . (c) The value of the land or property actually




COLO. REV. STAT. § 50-6-13(2) (1963).
127 United States v. 561.14 Acres in Johnson and Logan Counties, 206 F.Supp.
816, 826 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
128219 U.S. 180 (1911).
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determining factor was that the value of that part of the
Grizzard farm not taken was fifteen hundred dollars, when
the value of the entire place before the taking was three
thousand dollars.
1 29
The only decision by the Tenth Circuit touching upon the valuation
approach is found in United States v. Waymire, 30 a decision which
principally considered commission reports. The court commented:
Just compensation in a proceeding of this kind [a condem-
nation action] represents the difference between the fair
market value of the entire unit of property of an owner at
the time of taking and the fair market value of the part
remaining after the taking.1
3 '
The Supreme Court has expressed the objective aspect of just
compensation variously. In United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp., 32 an appeal from an award of compensation for war-time re-
quisition of copper, the Court said: "[T] he dominant consideration
always remains the same: What compensation is 'just' both to an
owner whose property is taken and to the public that must pay the
bill? ' u13 3 In United States v. New River Collieries Co.," 4 an appeal
of an award for war-time requisition of bituminous coal for use by
the Navy, the Court said:
Where private property is taken for public use, and there
is a market price prevailing at the time and place of the
taking, that price is just compensation.... More would be
unjust to the United States and less would deny the owner
what he is entitled to.1
35
It is often stated that "the owner shall be put in as good [a]
position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not
been taken.' 36 The statement, as far as it goes, is an accurate state-
ment of the principles predicating federal valuation. The full mean-
ing is that "the compensation to which the owner is entitled is
the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken.' 37 But an
award of "just compensation includes all elements of value that
inhere in the property, but it does not exceed market value fairly
129 Id. at 185.
130 202 F.2d 550 (10th Cir. 1953).
131 Id. at 554.
132 339 U.S. 121 (1950).
133 Id. at 123.
134 262 U.S. 341 (1923).
135 Id. at 344.
136 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923); see
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ; United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
137 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, supra note 136.
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determined." 5138 Taken alone and without reference to the full con-
text the initial statement is suggestive of the notion that the owner
should be indemnified, a subjective tort-like approach, rather than
compensated for the property taken within an objective framework
of application. Further, the statement is often quoted that "[t] he
just compensation required by the Constitution to be made to the
owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropria-
tion. ' 139 Again, the statement is one that must be considered in
proper context, as "the value compensable under the Fifth Amend-
ment, therefore is only that value which is capable of trans-
fer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some equivalent.
Its measure is the amount of that equivalent.' 4 0 In a purely objec-
tive approach no consideration should be given to the subjective
adaptability of the property to a condemnee's peculiar need for the
property or the fact that the condemnee was holding it for a parti-
cular purpose.' 41 In United States v. Petty Motor Co.,142 the Su-
preme Court summarized the matter as follows:
The Constitution and the statutes do not define the
meaning of just compensation. But it has come to be recog-
nized that just compensation is the value of the interest
taken. This is not the value to the owner for his particular
purposes or to the condemnor for some special use but a
so-called "market value." It is recognized that an owner
often receives less than the value of the property to him
but experience has shown that the rule is reasonably satis-
factory. Since "market value" does not fluctuate with the
needs of condemnor or condemnee but with the general
demand for the property, evidence of loss of profits, dam-
age to good will, the expense of relocation and other such
consequential losses are refused in federal condemnation
proceedings. 43
The before and after approach can be far from satisfactory to a
condemnee. For example, there are distinctive tax consequences for
both compensation for the part taken and the diminution in the
value of the remainder caused by the taking. That part of the
award of just compensation which represents value for the part
138 Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
139 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897).
140 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
141 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943) ; United States v.
5.42 Acres in Atlantic City (New Jersey), 182 F.2d 787, 789 (3rd Cir.
1950) ; St. Joe Paper Co. v. United States, 155 F.2d 93, 98 (5th Cir. 1945) ;
Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391, 396 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 772 (1944).
142 327 U.S. 372 (1942).
143 Id. at 377.
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taken is income capable of capital gain treatment for federal in-
come tax purposes.14 4 Distinctively, that amount of the award which
represents severance damage affects the base of the property re-
maining by way of an adjustment. 145 An award of just compensa-
tion, whether judicially determined or negotiated, which makes no
apportionment between compensation for the part taken and sever-
ance damage may result in severe hardship on the condemnee. In
Lapham v. United States,'146 a civil tax refund action, plaintiff's
negotiated settlement with the condemning authority failed to ap-
portion between value for the part taken and severance damage,
and the Internal Revenue Service refused to allow the condemnee's
claimed amount allocated to severance damage. The court of
appeals viewed the matter very narrowly and decided the matter
on a questionable evidentiary point and refused to permit the
plaintiff-condemnee to offer evidence beyond the scope of the
settlement agreement.
1 47
If value for the part taken and severance damage were separ-
ately found by the triers of fact and confirmed by judgment of the
court, particularly in a federal condemnation action, it would seem
that the question of apportionment would be settled with finality,
even to the satisfaction of the Internal Revenue Service. Nor would
it seem that subsequent administrative question or judicial colla-
teral attack of such a finding in a civil tax refund action would be
successful.
The decisions considered by this paper demonstrate that just
compensation as announced by judicial standards may not be full
and complete compensation. In recent years there has developed
an awareness of the shortcomings of judicially enunciated princi-
ples of just compensation. For example United States v. Petty
Motor Co.148 is frequently cited for the proposition that a condem-
nee is not ordinarily entitled to moving expenses with the rationali-
zation that only the property is taken and moving expenses are
incidental or consequential." 9 This unfairness with respect to land
acquisitions by military departments was to some degree rectified
by Congress in 1952.110 Similar legislation was enacted in 1958
affecting activities of the Department of the Interior, notably the
144 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 20.167 n. 93 (1957).
145 Id. § 20.174.
146 178 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1950).
147Id. at 995; see Greene v. United States, 173 F.Supp. 868, 869 (N.D. Ill.
1959).
148 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
149 Id. at 377.
15 0 Act of July 14, 1952, Ch. 726, § 401(b), 66 Stat. 606, 624; Act of September
2, 1962, 76 Stat. 511, 10 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
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Bureau of Reclamation. 151 The most recent legislation which con-
cerns every property owner whose source of title post-dates August
30, 1890, and is subject to the so-called Ditches and Canals Act,'
15 2
is the Act of September 5, 1964.153 Basically, this legislation repeals
the authority of the Bureau of Reclamation to construct and main-
tain ditches and canals over property subject to such patent reser-
vation without the payment of just compensation.
5 4
It is submitted that the judicial concepts of just compensation
do not, nor will they, compensate for all loss caused by public pro-
jects. It is clear that those areas of loss not compensated by judicial
principles can only be compensated by Congress. To this end greater
emphasis might be placed on legislative aspects of compensation
when projects are being considered by Congress for approval. An
example was demonstrated by Congress in connection with the
legislation authorizing the Chamizal exchange between the United
States and Mexico.1 '-5  A reading of the legislative authorization
151 72 Stat. 152 (1948), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1231-4 (1958), which provides, in part:
"That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized . . . to reimburse the
owner and tenants of land acquired . . . for expenses and other losses and
damages incurred by them in the process and as a direct result of such
moving themselves, their families, and their possessions as is occasioned
by said acquisition, which reimbursement shall be in addition to, but not
in duplication of, any payments that may otherwise be authorized by law:
Provided, That the total of such reimbursement . . . shall in no event
exceed 25 per centum of its [the land taken] fair value ......
152 26 Stat. 371 (1890), 43 U.S.C. § 945 (1958), which provides: "In all patents
for lands taken up after August 30, 1890, under any of the land laws of
the United States or on entries or claims validated by the Act of August
30, 1890, west of the one hundreth meridian, it shall be expressed that
there is reserved from the lands in said patent described a right of way
thereon for ditches or canals constructed by the authority of the United
States."
'15 Act of September 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 808, provides: "Notwithstanding the
existence of any reservation of right-of-way for canals under the Act of
August 30, 1890 (26 Stat. 371, 391; 43 U.S.C. 945), the Secretary of the
Interior shall pay just compensation, including severance damages, to the
owners of private land utilized for ditches or canals in connection with
any reclamation project, or any unit or any division of a reclamation
project, provided the construction of said ditches or canals commenced
after January 1, 1961, and such compensation shall be paid notwithstand-
ing the execution of any agreements or any judgments entered in any
condemnation proceeding, prior to the effective date of this Act." (Empha-
sis supplied.)
154 S. REP. No. 1507, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), states: "This legislation is
needed because of the numerous and serious inequities which have been
created in recent years by the 1890 act. Such inequities will continue to
be created in the future if this or similar legislation is not enacted."
1.5 Act of April 29, 1964, 78 Stat. 184, provides compensation, "(1) For prop-
erties - (a) For nonconforming abodes and minimum forms of shelter
for which there are no comparable properties on the market in the city
of El Paso and concerning which fair market value would be inadequate
to find minimum housing of equal utility, compensation to the owner up
to an amount which when added to the market value allowed for his prop-
erty, including land values, would enable purchase of minimum habitable
housing of similar utility in another residential section of said city.
"(b) For commercial properties for which there are no comparable
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leaves the distinct impression that affected property owners will
receive something more than the minimal judicially established
concepts of just compensation. 5 6
VII. COMPARABLE SALES AS EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE
Once the concept of market value has been accepted, the next
logical question concerns the evidence that will best establish this
standard. Ideally, a sale of the particular parcel being condemned
immediately preceding the condemnation action should provide ex-
cellent evidence of the market value. Unfortunately, circumstances
seldom coincide so well as to provide such convenient evidence of
value. However, the evidentiary predication is that prior sales of the
property condemned are admissible to prove the market value of
the subject property, if the prior sale is not too remote in time.157
What span of time must elapse before the prior sale becomes too
remote is, as it must be, left to the sound discretion of the trial
court. To reconcile the conflicting decisions is impossible.'
5 8
In the absence of recent voluntary sales of the subject property,
the next best evidence of value is the prices at which comparable
lands in the vicinity changed hands in actual, voluntary sales at or
about the time of taking. The admissibility of comparable real
estate transetions as evidence tending to prove the value of the
property taken is no longer in dispute in the Tenth Circuit. In
Onego Corp. v. United States,15 9 the court stated:
properties on the market in or near El Paso, Texas, compensation to the
owner up to an amount which, when added to the total fair market value,
including the land value, would compensate the owner for the 'value in
use' of the real estate to him. Such 'value in use' is to be determined on
the basis of replacement cost less deterioration and obsolescence in existing
real estate and taking into consideration factors bearing upon income
attributable to the real estate.
"(2) For loss in business: (a) Loss of profits directly resulting from
relocation, limited to the period between termination of business in the
old location and commencement of business in the new, such period not
to exceed thirty days.
"(b) Loss to owner resulting from inability to rent to others housing
of commercial space that can be reasonably related to uncertainties arising
out of the pending acquisition of the owner's property by the United States,
such losses limited to those incurred after July 18, 1963, and prior to the
making by the United States of a firm offer to purchase."
136 See 110 CONG. REC. 2320, 2323 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1964) (remarks of Sen-
ator Yarborough) : "When the Chamizal Convention with Mexico was
before the Committee on Foreign Relations last December, and during the
debate on the ratification of the Chamizal Treaty, in the Senate this year,
the plight of the American citizen residing in that part of the Chamizal
zone which became undisputed Mexican territory under the convention,
was stressed by me and other Senators. The bill is required to implement
the convention and to compensate the property owners and tenants who
will be dispossessed as a result of the Chamizal settlement."
17 H & H Supply Co. v. United States, 194 F.2d 553, 555 (10th Cir. 1952).
158 See Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 781 (1957).
159 295 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1961).
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The value with which we are concerned is fair market
value. That was what the Government was required to pay
when it condemned these leases. Fair market value has
been defined as that price which a willing purchaser would
pay and a willing seller would accept under ordinary cir-
cumstances.... The best evidence of such value is like and
comparable sales within a reasonable time preceding the
condemnation.'6 0
These statements place the Tenth Circuit in accord with the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Baetjer v. United States,16 '
the effect of comparable sales was described as follows:
Clearly such [sales] transactions have a tendency to show
fair market value. In fact, in the absence of recent trans-
actions of a like nature involving the land taken itself,
they are the best evidence of market value. What com-
parable land changes hands for on the market at about the
time of taking is usually the best evidence of market value
available. In the absence of such evidence a determination
of value becomes at best only a guess by informed per-
sons.
162
Were the issue one evaluating a fungible asset commonly found
in the arena of everyday trading, the ascertainment of market
value would logically be the price paid for comparable commodities
on the open market at the date and place of the commodity in
question. Within the traditional notions of the law, real property is
unique, one parcel to another. However, this view does not change
the principle that market value as established by comparable sales
remains the best measure of just compensation. 163 The fact that the
property is unique and sales few does not derogate the market
value standard but simply makes application of the standard more
difficult.
64
Given the principle that comparable sales are the best evidence
of market value, the question then arises what method of proof may
be employed in order to utilize them. Traditionally it appears there
160 Id. at 463; see also United States v. Featherston, 325 F.2d 539, 542 (10th
Cir. 1963).
161 143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 772 (1944).
162Baetjer v. United States, supra note 161 at 397; see Bailey v. United
States, 325 F.2d 571, 572 (1st Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Katz, 213 F.2d
799, 800 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 857 (1954); Cementerio Buxeda
v. Puerto Rico, 196 F.2d 177, 180 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 876
(1952) ; United States v. Iriarte, 166 F.2d 800, 803 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 816 (1948).
163 United States v. Featherston, 321 F.2d 539, 542 (10th Cir. 1963); Onego
Corp. v. United States, 295 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1961).
164 United States v. Toronto Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949).
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are two diverse approaches.0 5 The narrow approach to the question
is found in those jurisdictions which follow the so-called "Penn-
sylvania Rule," which adopt the position that on direct examination
experts may not refer to comparable sales unless otherwise proven,
and evidence of comparable sales is admissible, if at all, only on
cross-examination and for the limited purpose of testing the expert's
opinion.166 The broader, and it is submitted, the more enlightened,
approach is found in those jurisdictions which have adopted the so-
called "Massachusetts Rule," which permits evidence of sales price
and other sales data of comparable properties on direct examination
of an expert to demonstrate the basis and reasoning for the expert's
opinion.167 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has adopted
the latter approach. In the United States v. Featherston,'6 the court
firmly laid to rest any question as to which approach is to be fol-
lowed. Speaking through Judge Breitenstein, the court stated:
Direct testimony of a real estate expert on comparable
sales to bolster his opinion on value is generally objected
to on the grounds of violation of the best evidence and the
hearsay rules and on the fear that the admission of such
evidence would lead the trial into collateral issues. Admis-
sibility is urged because the best evidence of value is the
prices at which comparable lands have recently been sold
and the most objective facts which the expert can use to
estimate what price would be agreed upon by hypothetical
willing buyers and sellers have acted in regard to compar-
able properties. Further, if an expert may not testify on
165 See Annots., 85 A.L.R.2d 110 (1962), 118 A.L.R. 870 (1939).
166 See, e.g., Cline v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 182 Kan. 155, 318 P.2d 1000
(1957); Re Condemnation of Lands in Battle Creek, 341 Mich. 412, 67
N.W.2d 49 (1954); Simpson v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 384 Pa.
335, 121 A.2d 84 (1956).
167 See, e.g., Housing Authority of Decatur v. Decatur Land Co., 258 Ala. 607,
64 So. 2d 594 (1953) ; State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343 (1960) ;
Campbell v. New Haven, 101 Conn. 173, 125 Atl. 650 (1924) ; Chicago v.
Lehmann, 262 Ill. 468, 104 N.E. 829 (1914). Colorado adheres to the "Mas-
sachusetts Rule" by virtue of statute, which is susceptible of rather narrow
application so far as the range or scope of testimony by a valuation expert
is concerned. COLO. REv. STAT. § 50-1-21 (1963) provides: "Evidence con-
cerning value of property. - Any witness in a proceeding under this
chapter, in any court of record of this state wherein the value of real
property is involved, may state the consideration involved in any recorded
transfer of property, otherwise material and relevant, which was examined
and utilized by him in arriving at his opinion; provided, he has personally
examined the record and communicated directly with and verified the
amount of such consideration with either the buyer or seller. Any such
testimony, shall be admissible as evidence of such consideration and shall
remain subject to rebuttal as to the time and actual consideration involved
and subject to objections as to its relevancy and materiality."
16s 325 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1963).
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direct examination as to the basis and reasons for his opin-
ion the weight of that opinion is greatly reduced ...
Although the best evidence and hearsay rules are
important, they should not be applied to prevent an expert
giving in a reasonable way the basis for his opinion ...
The fear of trial prolongation by exploration of collateral
issues does not impress us. Within reasonable bounds, the
expert may testify to the facts upon which his opinion of
value is based and the court in the exercise of its sound
discretion can assure that the evidence does not go afield. 16 9
To anyone who has ever tried a condemnation action, the decision
in Featherston contains compelling logic. The hearsay rule is an
exclusionary rule designed to safeguard against evidence which is
"untrustworthy.' ' 70 The traditional objection that sales not other-
wise in evidence cannot be referred to in an appraiser's direct testi-
mony is met by the fact that the triers of fact are not bound to
accept all or any part of the expert's conclusions. If the expert's
predication is improper or unsound, this can be amply demonstrated
on cross-examination where the facts involving comparability and
the expert's reasoning process can be fully explored. Another reason
which will eventually mature is found in the discovery processes.1
7 1
As yet, however, there is a manifest divergence of judicial opinion
concerning the discoverability of a valuation expert's work prod-
uct.17 2 When there is a free and complete exchange of facts through
discovery processes, there will be no reason why the facts upon
which the expert predicates his opinion cannot be thoroughly pre-
tested by the opposition. The concern of trial prolongation and un-
trustworthiness will remain the concern only of the commentators.
The best evidence rule is, at best, a hypertechnical exclusionary
principle. Its importance is best demonstrated by the ease with
which an objection on such grounds may be waived.
'" Id. at 542. See Harwell v. United States, 316 F.2d 791, 793 (10th Cir.
1963); H & H Supply Co. v. United States, 194 F.2d 553, 556 (10th Cir.
1952).
170V WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940).
171 In United States v. 23.76 Acres in Anne Arundel County, 32 F.R.D. 593,
597 (D. Md. 1963), the court stated: "Where value is the basic, if not
sole, issue in litigation, it is not unfair for either party to know in advance
of trial what the other party intends to prove, what opinions his opponent's
experts hold, the method by which those opinions were formulated, and
the facts upon which they are based. These are all matters to be presented
to the trier of the facts at trial. 'Mutual knowledge of all the relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. * * * The
deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the dis-
closure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility of surprise,' Hickman v. Taylor, supra, 329
U.S. p. 507, 67 S.Ct. p. 391."
17-2 See cases cited id. at 595.
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The hearsay facet was recently considered by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. 18.46 Acres in the
Town of Swanton.17"1 The court reversed the district court for refus-
ing to allow an expert to testify about sales which he considered
comparable. The district court had excluded such testimony as
hearsay. The court of appeals noted the necessary broad discretion
accorded a trial court in such instances, but stated "[i] n the case at
bar, the court excluded evidence of comparable sales as hearsay and
not in the exercise of I its I discretion .... ,,174 The rationale of the
court of appeals is that the question of comparable sales data is less
a question of technical admissibility than of the weight to be
accorded the particular transactions upon which the expert bases
his opinion. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has ap-
proved the Swanton decision, holding in a similar situation that the
expert's testimony concerning comparable sales was admissible after
a prima facie showing of comparability. 1 75 In other federal jurisdic-
tions there have been numerous decisions that sales prices of com-
parable properties are admissible as evidence of value in federal
condemnation proceedings. 176
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is occasionally urged that restraints or limitations should be
placed upon the executive exercise of the federal power of eminent
domain. Seemingly flagrant examples of summary treatment in
particular instances are cited to support the contention for a more
limited or restrained executive prerogative, and the finger of por-
tent is pointed in accusation at what is typically described as un-
fettered bureaucracy in its worst and most distasteful connotation.
Fundamentally, any legal procedure which is capable of summarily
divesting a property owner's interests without benefit of the tradi-
173312 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1963).
174 Id. at 288.
175 Harwell v. United States, 316 F.2d 791, 794 (10th Cir. 1963).
176 See United States v. Johnson, 285 F.2d 35, 40 (9th Cir. 1960); United
Stat's v. Benning Housing Corp., 276 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Vater, 259 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1958) ; United States
v. Meadow Brook Club, 259 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
921 (1958) ; United States v. Lowrie, 246 F.2d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1957) ;
United States v. 63.04 Acres at Lido Beach, 245 F.2d 140, 144 (2d Cir.
1957); District of Columbia Redev. L. A. v. 61 Parcels of Land, 235 F.2d
864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1956); International Paper Co. v. United States, 227
F.2d 201, 208 (5th Cir. 1955); Knollman v. United States, 214 F.2d 106,
109 (6th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. 5139.5 Acres in Aiken and Barnwell
Counties, 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1952); United States v. Ham, 187
F.2d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Westchester County Park Comm'n v. United
States, 143 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726 (1944);
Ramming Real Estate Co. v. United States, 122 F.2d 892, 894 (8th Cir.
1941) ; United States v. Meyer, 113 F.2d 387, 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 706 (1940).
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tionally conceived "day in court" is alien to all legal principles
ordinarily encountered in the practice of law. Without question, the
federal power of eminent domain has been cut from extraordinary
cloth.
The wisdom of granting broad latitude to executive agencies in
connection with land acquisition for federal projects under such
legislation as the Declaration of Taking Act 177 is best understood
when considered with the fundamental necessity for a uniform
application in all instances. The federal exercise of the power of
eminent domain is national in scope and application. The confusion
which would result if the federal government were required to
adhere to the myriad variations among the states in real property
concepts and divestiture procedures is indicated by the experience
prior to the adoption of Rule 71A, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The nature of the power and its source and application, a single
power and a single sovereign, demand a single standard of fairness.
Such matters as the scope and magnitude, the location of, the
date of commencement of a particular federal project, as well as the
preliminary selection of land to be acquired, the adequacy of the
agency appraisal, the good-faith or lack of good-faith in preliminary
negotiations, and the determination of estimated just compensation
are matters which fall, properly, in a realm ordinarily excluded
from judicial review or supervision. These matters are determina-
tions of a "political-policy" nature. When one disagrees with deter-
minations regularly made in such instances, the recourse is, theo-
retically, to the polls rather than to the courtroom. The judicial
prerogative is to be exercised after, and only after, abuses occur,
fundamentally guaranteed protections have been transgressed, and
the executive agency has exceeded delegated legislative powers.
The position taken by the courts continues to be a traditionally
evolved notion of a balancing of considerations:
[I] t is one thing to provide a method by which the citizen
may be compensated for a wrong done to him by the Gov-
ernment. It is a far different matter to permit a court to
exercise its compulsive powers to restrain the Government
from acting, or to compel it to act. There are the strongest
reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief cannot
be had against the sovereign. The Government, as represen-
tative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in
its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question
property or contract right. As was early recognized, "The
interference of the Courts with the performance of the
177 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-f (1958).
VOL. XLI
4EDERAL LAW O EMINENT DOMAIN
executive departments of the government, would be pro-
ductive of nothing but mischief .... ,,178
Ordinarily, the profession's time would be better spent and clients'
interests better served by concentrating on the compensatory
aspects of the exercise of the power of eminent domain rather than
quixotic challenges of the political-policy considerations predicating
particular choices.
The concept of just compensation as guaranteed by the fifth
amendment and as judicially defined does not necessarily comport
with popular tort-like notions of compensation which would make
an aggrieved party whole. In modern-day application the scope of
allowable compensation is not commensurate with other standards
of recovery. The degree of limitation is paradoxical when con-
trasted with the nearly unfettered scope of exercise of the power
by the executive branches of the federal government. If any conclu-
sion can be drawn from decisions affecting valuation involving
federal eminent domain, it is that just compensation as used in the
fifth amendment is a minimum guarantee and does not necessarily
mean full, complete and fair compensation for all losses suffered.
The rationalization that it is the property, not the property owner's
interest, which is protected by the fifth amendment and for which
the compensation is to be paid can be, and frequently is, limiting
in a context of restitution, particularly to the landowner-
condemnee, individually. The concept of just compensation has
been interpreted to result in hardship in certain instances. For
example, the following have been enumerated as constituting
"incidental losses or expenses" for which no compensation is
required:
Costs of moving personal property and of the discon-
necting, dismantling, reassembly, and reinstalling of struc-
tures, machinery, equipment, etc.
Transportation and other expenses to move a displaced
family to replacement housing.
Transportation and other expenses in search for a
replacement housing.
Transportation and other expenses in search for a
replacement farm or other property.
Expenses in obtaining substitute real property, such as
costs of apraisal [sic], survey, necessary charges to obtain
financing, title examination, and closing costs.
Losses on forced sale or disposition of personal property
not usable after displacement.
178 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
1964
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
Expenses incidental to the transfer of title to real prop-
erty required by the Government, such as recording fees,
transfer taxes, clerk fees, etc.; penalty costs for prepayment
of mortgage incident to the real property; and real prop-
erty taxes paid to a taxing entity which are allocable to a
period subsequent to the transfer.
Increased cost of rent for substitute dwelling or other
property.
Increased cost to acquire a substitute home, farm, or
business.
Loss of homeownership because of inability to obtain
financing within the financial means of the displacee.
Loss of rental or other income between the time of
announcement of a public improvement and the time of
taking.
Business interruption.
Loss of going concern value, goodwill, or livelihood,
where a business cannot relocate without a substantial loss
of its patronage.
Loss of opportunity to continue in business, by small
operator with inadequate capital or credit resources to fi-
nance relocation; by elderly operator with inadequate
training or health to withstand pressures of relocation; i.e.,
increased costs, more competitive situation, greater risks,
etc.
Loss of employment due the discontinuance or reloca-
tion of a displaced business.17 9
One can only conclude from the foregoing enumeration that the
non-compensible aspects of a condemnation action can, indeed, be
quite extensive and the resultant hardship quite real.
As enunciated by the Supreme Court, it appears that the con-
stitutional guarantee of just compensation was never intended to
compensate for all monetary losses.1, 0 Conversely, however, the
Court has frequently indicated the way to remedy the existent
narrow scope of the concept of just compensation. In reviewing an
action in which the condemnees were not allowed to recover for
business losses, the Court stated:
[I]t does not follow that, in the absence of an agreement,
179 STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT SUBCOMM. ON REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION, 88TH
CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS
AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY
ASSISTED PROGRAMS, at 54 (Comm. Print No. 31, 1964). Hereinafter cited
as STUDY.
180 United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
VOL. XLI
FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
the plaintiffs can compel payment for such losses. To re-
cover, they must show some statutory right conferred.
States have not infrequently directed the payment of com-
pensation in similar situations. The constitutions of some
require that compensation be made for consequential dam-
ages to private property resulting from public improve-
ments. . . . Others have, in authorizing specific public
improvements, conferred the right to such compensation.
... Congress had, of course, the power to make like provi-
sion here. T1 '
If dissatisfaction with the present-day standards of allowable
just compensation exists, as it certainly does, and if it is to be reme-
died, the burden is upon Congress and ultimately upon its consti-
tuency-the electorate-to initiate remedial legislation which will
overhaul the present-day narrow standards. The quest for such
remedial legislation is not a new one. However, past efforts have
been either unsuccessful or, at best, mere piecemeal attempts.
8 2
Despite one of the law's favorite fictions, the electorate cannot be
presumed or be charged with the burden of knowledge with respect
to the existent inequities with which they are not actually acquaint-
ed. The inequitable aspects, the shortcomings of present-day stand-
ards of just compensation, are not widely experienced. Consequent-
ly the electorate-cause advocating reform or new measures of com-
pensation will never be widespread or particularly vocal. Unfor-
tunately, the cause usually becomes of interest only when one's
property rights are affected; then it is too late.
Anticipatorily, the quest for such expanded Congressional re-
lief will not be easy. One can foresee some degree of opposition
from land-acquiring agencies of the executive branch. The prospec-
tive added dollar-cost of land-acquisition when placed in a context
of over-all budgetary consideration would act as a limitation on the
scope and size of future agency programs. If any potential reduction
in either the scope or the number of future projects should appear
on the horizon official opposition is inevitable.
The Select Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisition was
created in the belief that present-day concepts of just compensation
were inadequate and certain acquisition practices of executive agen-
cies should be changed.18 3 The Subcommittee was first created in
181 Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 345 (1925) ; see United States v.
Willow River Power Co., supra note 180 at 502; Batten v. United States,
306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962) ; cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
182 See, e.g., 72 Stat. 152 (1958), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1231-34 (1958), supra note 151.
1s3 See STUDY at 2.
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the 87th Congress and was recreated in the 88th Congress. 8 4 To
quote the Subcommittee:
There have been a growing number of complaints to the
Congress in recent years, questioning the fairness of Gov-
ernment agency land acquisition practices, the sufficiency
of traditional standards of compensation, and the adequacy
of assistance for persons adversely affected by public im-
provement programs undertaken by the Federal Govern-
ment, or with the aid of Federal funds.
There were reports of many persons suffering severe
hardships and financial losses and of others being overpaid.
There was particular concern about the lack of uniformity
in the various programs, with citizens apparently receiving
varying amounts of compensation or assistance depending
on the program involved rather than the actual loss suf-
fered. 8 5
The formation of the Subcommittee resulted in hearings being held,
executive agencies queried, and generally a thorough investigation
conducted of the complaints and problems mentioned above. Pres-
ent-day standards of compensation and agency practices were
roundly criticized. The most notable accomplishment of the Sub-
committee's effort is the recommended legislation which is described
as the "Fair Compensation Act of 1965. ' '186 Space does not permit
either an analysis of the Subcommittee report or a digest of the
recommended legislation; however, there are certain sections which
should be of interest.
Section 101187 represents a uniform policy of land-acquisition
practices:
184 Id. at 1.
185 Ibid.
186Id. at 145.
187 Id. at 147, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," provides: "Sec.
101. (a) In order to encourage the acquisition of real property by amicable
agreements with owners, to relieve congestion in the courts, to assure con-
sistent treatment for owners in the many Federal programs, and to pro-
mote public confidence in Federal land acquisition practices, heads of
Federal agencies shall, to the greatest extent practicable, be guided by
the following policies:
(1) The head of a Federal agency should make every reasonable effort
to acquire real property by negotiated purchase.
(2) Real property should be appraised before the initiation of nego-
tiations, and the owner or his designated representative should be given
an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the
property.
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for property, the head of the
Federal agency concerned should establish a price which he believes to
be a fair and reasonable consideration therefor and should make a prompt
offer to acquire the property for the full amount so established. In no
event should such price be less than the appraised fair value of such
property, as approved by such agency head.
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(4) If only a part or an interest in a property is to be acquired, the
head of the Federal agency concerned should, if he determines that the
remainder property will be benefited or damaged, provide the owner with a
statement of his estimate of -
(A) the fair value of the entire property immediately before the
acquisition;
(B) the fair value of the property remaining immediately after the
acquisition;
(C) the fair value of the part or interest actually taken;
(D) the damages, if any, resulting to the remaining property, and
an explanation thereof; and
(E) the benefits, if any, accruing to the remaining property, and
an explanation thereof.
(5) No owner should be required to surrender possession of real prop-
erty before the head of the Federal agency concerned pays the agreed
purchase price, or deposits with the court for the benefit of the owner an
amount not less than the appraised fair value of such property as approved
by such agency head, or the amount of the award of compensation in the
condemnation proceeding for such property.
(6) The construction or development of public improvements should
be so scheduled that no person lawfully occupying real property will be
required to move from a dwelling, or to move his business or farm opera-
tion without at least one hundred and eighty days' written notice from
the head of the Federal agency concerned, of the date by which such move
is required.
(7) If the head of the Federal agency concerned does not require a
building, structure or other improvement acquired as a part of the real
property, he should offer to permit its owner to remove it. As a condition
of removal, an appropriate agreement should be required, whereby the fair
value of such building, structure, or improvement for removal from the
real property, as determined by such agency head, will be deducted from
the compensation otherwise to be paid for the real property, however de-
termined, or will be paid to the agency head by such owner.
(8) If the head of a Federal agency permits an owner or tenant to
occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or for
a period subject to termination by the Government on short notice, the
amount of rent required should not exceed the fair rental value of the
property to a short-term occupier.
(9) In no event should the head of a Federal agency either advance
the time of condemnation, or defer condemnation and the deposit of funds
in court for the use of the owner, in order to compel an agreement on the
price to be paid for the property. If an agency head cannot reach an agree-
ment with the owner, after negotiations have continued for a reasonable
time, he should promptly institute condemnation proceedings and, at the
time or as soon thereafter as practicable, file a declaration of taking and
deposit funds with the court in accordance with the Act of February 27,
1931 (46 Stat. 1421).
(10) If an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the
power of eminent domain, the head of the Federal agency concerned should
institute formal condemnation proceedings. No Federal agency head should
intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings
to prove the fact of the taking of his property.
(11) If the acquisition of only part of a property would leave its owner
with an uneconomic remnant, the head of the Federal agency concerned
should acquire the entire property.
(12) In determining the boundaries of a proposed public improvement,
the head of the Federal agency concerned should taken [sic] into account
human considerations, including the economic and social effects of such
determination on the owners and tenants of real property in the area, in
addition to engineering and other factors.
(b) The provisions of this section, being general policies for the guid-
ance of Federal agencies, shall create no rights or liabilities not otherwise
existing or available, nor affect the validity of any property acquisitions by
purchase or condemnation."
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It would make it clear that the Congress desires that pub-
lic agency policies and procedures for the acquisition of
real property should be fair and consistent, and should be
directed to giving the property owner the full measure of
compensation authorized by law promptly, with a minimum
of inconvenience, and without forcing him to prolonged
negotiations or to costly litigation.""
Unquestionably, a uniformity in approach and treatment of con-
demnees by respective agencies is a desired and a necessary end.
At present, there are divergencies in respective internal procedures
in land-acquisition practices among the several executive agencies.
One prospective criticism of the proposed policy is that it is no more
than mere policy. There is no attempt to centralize or monitor the
recommended policies and the changes which would ensue from
agency compliance or possible non-compliance. In order to assure
that executive agencies would fully comply with the proposed Con-
gressional policy mandates, one agency, properly the Department of
Justice, should be charged with the duty of monitoring necessary
changes in procedure. The successes or failures of the changes and
the policy itself could be made known to Congress by a subsequent
report. Otherwise, Congress will face a probable need for additional
studies.
Paragraph 101 (a) (2) of the recommended policy section '9
should be made more meaningful. This paragraph provides that
there should be an appraisal of the property prior to negotiations
and the owner or his representative should have the opportunity "to
accompany" the appraiser during his inspection of the property. The
latter statement merely reiterates existing practice in the great ma-
jority of instances. If the notion is that "accompanying" an apprais-
er during inspection connotes knowledge or an understanding of
what the appraiser is doing, then it is submitted such equation is
grossly in error. To provide a meaningful policy, the landowner or
his representative should have the opportunity to inspect and exam-
ine the resultant appraisal. The present shroud of secrecy which
surrounds the contents and thought-processes contained in apprais-
als is absurd. How can it be imagined that any prospective con-
demnee can place full and complete confidence in a valuation in
which the essential valuation processes are withheld from the land-
owner? Realistically, few people are better acquainted with land
than the landowner himself, particularly in rural areas. This knowl-
edge is not so totally unrelated to value as to render submission of
188 STUDY at 124.
189 Id. at 147.
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the appraisal report a vain gesture. If the appraised value for the
United States' negotiations is either unsound or inaccurate in any
particular, such a fundamental error or oversight should be dis-
covered and remedied at the outset. As it is now with the limited
attitude toward discovery of such matters taken by certain juris-
dictions, the actual trial becomes the first opportunity to learn the
important why of the condemnor's valuation - a time when it is
too late to rectify, perhaps, fundamental errors which all parties
could have recognized.
Section 102 of the recommended "Fair Compensation Act of
1965 "190 is an attempt by the Subcommittee to define just compensa-
tion. The Subcommittee recognizes, and justifiably so, that "market-
value" cannot be defined with "scientific precision."'u 1 However, a
definition of market-value should prove helpful where condemnees
are unfamiliar with the nature of the guarantees of the fifth amend-
ment and should also prove helpful for trial court instructions to
triers of fact. On the negative side of the ledger, the proposed defin-
ition ignores the inequitable effect of the time lapse between proj-
110 Id. at 149, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965" provides:
"Sec. 102. (a) If the head of any Federal agency acquires real property for
public use in any State or the District of Columbia by purchase or con-
demnation, the fair value of such property shall be paid as compensation
therefor.
(b) As used in this title-
(1) the term 'fair value' means-
(A) the highest cash price which a property could reasonably be
expected to bring if exposed for sale in the open market for a reasonable
time, taking into consideration all lawful uses to which such property is
adapted and could reasonably be put: Provided, That any change in such
price prior to the date of valuation caused by the public improvement for
which the property is acquired, and any decrease in such price caused by
the likelihood that the property would be acquired for the proposed pub-
lic improvement, other than that caused by physical deterioration within
the reasonable control of the owner, shall be disregarded in determining
such price; or
(B) if only a part of an interest in a property is acquired, the
difference between the fair value of the entire property immediately be-
fore the acquisition, determined as in paragraph (A), and the highest cash
price which the remaining property could reasonably be expected to bring
immediately after the acquisition allowing a reasonable period of exposure
for sale in the open market, taking into consideration all lawful uses to
which such property is adapted and could reasonably be put, and all bene-
fits and damages affecting such price which result to the remaining pro-
Derty because of its severance from, and the use to be made of the property
or property interests acquired, and because of the use of other property or
property interests acquired for the same public improvement.
(2) The term 'date of valuation' means the date of possession, the date
of a purchase agreement, the date of filing a declaration of taking, the ef-
fective date of a court order of possession, or the date of trial, whichever
is the earliest.
(c) No provision of this section shall be construed as affecting any
property rights of the United States or any rights of the United States
under its navigation servitude."
11)1 STUDY at 127.
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ect announcement and eventual acquisition, particularly where a
number of years intervene and the prospective condemnee desires
to relocate near the project.
Section 106 of the recommended "Fair Compensation Act of
1965 "1192 provides some measure of recompense for certain expenses
when the condemnee has (a) successfully defended against the
alleged right or power of the United States to condemn in a parti-
cular instance, and (b) where condemnation proceedings, once in-
stituted, are subsequently abandoned. The recommended section as
far as it goes only touches the threshold of an area of need. Unfortu-
nately, the need is greater than the scope of the section. To under-
score the need one must consider that there is no provision for at-
torney fees, appraisal costs, or other experts' costs in federal con-
demnation actions. Moreover, Rule 71A(1) negates the award of
costs ordinarily recoverable in other civil actions.1 93 This precludes
reimbursement for necessary lay witnesses who may be required to
testify as to essential facts upon which the experts bolster their
opinions. Underlying this is a failure to recognize the monumental
decision facing a condemnee who considers the prospect of a judicial
challenge of an executive agency's determination of estimated just
compensation and have the question determined by judicial process.
If the condemnee elects to have his day in court, the expense of at-
torney fees, appraisal fees, and ordinary witness fees, come either
out of his pocket or out of his award. These financial realities tend
to place the condemnee at a disadvantage from the outset, because
simple economics demand that the award be considerably in excess
192 Id. at 151, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," provides: "Sec.
106. (a) The court having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by a
Federal agency to acquire property by condemnation shall award the
owner such sum as will in the opinion of the court reimburse such owner
for his fair and reasonable costs and expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney, appraisal and engineering fees, actually incurred because of the con-
demnation proceedings, if -
(1) the final judgment is for the owner on the question of the right to
condemn, or
(2) the proceeding is abandoned with respect to any such property.
(b) Any award made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall
be paid by the head of the Federal agency for whose benefit the condem-
nation proceeding was instituted out of appropriations available to such
agency.
(c) The court rendering a judgment for the plaintiff in an action
brought under title 28, United States Code, section 1346(a) (2) or title
28, United States Code, section 1491, awarding compensation for the taking
of property by a Federal agency, or the Attorney General effecting a
settlement of any such action, may determine and award or allow to
such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum as will
in the opinion of the court or the Attorney General reimburse such plaintiff
for his fair and reasonable costs and expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such
action."
193 Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A (1), provides: "Costs are not subject to Rule 54(d)."
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of the United States' offer for the condemnee to realize a net return
even approximating that which he would have otherwise received.
The preceding section of the recommended legislation are of
general interest and were selected for inclusion and comment to
evoke some understanding of the nature of the Subcommittee rec-
ommendations. Other recommendations deal with somewhat more
specialized areas, but are nonetheless important; these concern
themselves with such areas as: relocation payments,19 4 relocation
assistance programs, 195 relocation payments a n d assistance, 19 6
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 affecting invol-
untary conversions, 197 assistance programs through the Small Busi-
ness Administration,'9" unemployment compensation for displaced
employees, 199 and rental and home purchase assistance for low or
moderate income families.
00
If anything can be gleaned from the decisions relating to just
compensation, it is the single conclusion that a judicial enlargement
of the compensable aspects of a taking, however fervently wished
for, is extremely unlikely. The noncompensatory aspects of present-
day judicial standards extend throughout all applications of the
power of eminent domain. A remedy now exists in the hands of
Congress. One need entertain no illusion that such a remedy will be
easily attained. The process of resolution should provide an inter-
esting insight into the philosophies of the executive and legislative
branches with respect to governmental responsibility.
194 STUDY at 151, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," § 107.
195 Id. at 152, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," § 108.
196 Id. at 154, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," §§ 111-15.
197 Id. at 159, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," §§ 201-04.
198 Id. at 161, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," §§ 301-02.
199 Id. at 162, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," §§ 1701-06.
200 Id. at 164, recommended "Fair Compensation Act of 1965," §§ 401-05.
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A NEW LOOK AT THE NATURAL LAW
OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
HAROLD C. PETROWITZ*
Controversy continues among legal scholars as to which philo-
sophy should guide the development of law. The three philosophies
perhaps most commonly advanced are those based on natural law,
on legal positivism, and on realism. Some commentators have taken
the view that these philosophies are incompatible.1 An effort will
be made in this discussion to demonstrate that this may not neces-
sarily be so. It is the author's specific objective to comment on some
new ideas relating Thomistic natural law to legal positivism and
legal realism, and to explore the natural law theory as the basis of
a world legal order. In so doing it will be useful to review the con-
tribution made to legal philosophy by St. Thomas, to analyze his
legal theories, and to see what meaning they have today. This is a
convenient point of departure because St. Thomas took the theories
of the Greek and Stoic philosophers and moulded them into con-
cise principles that have formed the basis of most legal philosophic
writing since his time.
THE ENVIRONMENT OF THOMISTIc NATURAL LAW
St. Thomas lived from 1224 to 1274 A.D., a period which saw
Europe emerging from the so-called dark ages. Thomas, far from
being a cloistered monk, was acutely aware of the political and soci-
al changes taking place around him. The student of his work cannot
help but be amazed at the brilliance and range of his thinking and
by his enormous output. Fortunately Thomas was permitted to re-
main an essentially independent scholar and therefore had the full
opportunity of developing his philosophical ideas. First, last, and al-
ways, however, St. Thomas was a theologian. All of his writing was
directed toward that end and his words on other matters were sub-
ordinate to it. It is somewhat anomalous that his theory of natural
law, which forms a relatively small part of his monumental Summa
Theologica, should have had such an impact on legal philosophy.
Just as the Summa was unfinished, his theory of natural law was
not completely developed, a fact that has caused much difficulty for
his commentators.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American Univer-
sity. B.S., University of Michigan; LL.B., Georgetown University; LL.M.,
Columbia University.
1 See, e.g., MARITAIN, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 54 (1958).
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THE NATURAL LAW OF ST. THOMAS
St. Thomas defines law as "an ordinance of reason for the com-
mon good, made by him who has care of the community, and pro-
mulgated. '2 Note that for Thomas there is no direct tie between law
and theology. His definition appears to be technically correct and
2 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I of pt. II, Q. 90, art. 4 (Eng. Dominion
Province transl. 1947) [hereinafter cited as S.T., e.g.: I-II S.T. 90, 4]. The
development of this definition can be followed through the articles of
Question 90: "Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced
to act or is restrained from acting . . . . Now the rule and measure of
human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts ......
I-IL S.T. 90, 1. The latter statement is of great significance; it demonstrates
the importance that Thomas attaches to the function of human reason. I-I
S.T. 90, 2:
[TIhe law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness.
• . .Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good,
any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be
devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common
good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
I-II S.T. 90, 4:
A law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule
or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and
measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force
which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have
to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them
by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to
obtain its force.
19BWlR jnr~ovsooDS 1a
.. . .. .. .. . . l. . C......... 1






mer suits this spring
have taken on a long,
lean athletic look. Ex-
clusive XK styling
makes you look a lit-
tle more-so in the
shoulders and chest
with the new "you-
ishaped" shoulder, and
N a little less-so around
the middle. And you'll
find handsome new,
coloring and fabrics
in the new spring
Kuppenheimers. Come







DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
does not suffer from an apparent error as befell Austin's definition
of law based on the command theory.
Thomas classifies law 3 into eternal law-the dictates of divine
reason governing the whole community of the universe; divine law
-rules derived from eternal law and made known by revelation;
natural law-the participation of the eternal law in rational crea-
tures; and human law-particular determinations for the guidance
of human activity, devised by human reason, proceeding from the
precepts of natural law, and which may be derived from eternal law
if based on right reason.4 It is thus seen that, according to St. Thom-
as, divine law, natural law, and much of human law are based on
the eternal law, but that natural law is distinguished from divine
law, the former constituting intrinsic eternal law and the latter ex-
trinsic eternal law.
St. Thomas develops his first principles of natural law in true
Aristotelian manner. Recognizing that in demonstrating the truth
of any principle it is necessary to rely on prior demonstrable
truths until finally the first truth is reached which is incapable of
being demonstrated, he states a fundamental proposition which he
claims is self-evident because its predicate is contained in the notion
of its subject.5 He says:
Now as being is the first thing that falls under the appre-
hension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under
the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed
to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect
of good. Consequently the first principle in the practical
reason is the one founded on the notion of good, viz., that
3ld. Q. 91.
4Id. Q. 93, 3.
5 St. Thomas cites as an example of an undemonstrable truth in the specu-
lative order that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same
time. A. E. Taylor gives Aristotle's explanation of first principles in these
words: "[S]uccessive repetitions of the same sense perceptions give rise
to a single experience and it is by reflection on experience that we become
aware of the most ultimate truths." TAYLOR, ARISTOTLE 53 (1943). A
combination of intellectual and intuitive induction from sense perception
seems to take place. Gilson puts it this way:
The human intellect possesses therefore a light just sufficient in order
to acquire the knowledge of the intelligibles to which it can raise itself
by means of sensible things .... In a certain sense, indeed, we possess
in us the germ of all knowledge .... These pre-formed seeds, of which
we have natural knowledge, are first principles . . . . [T] hey are the
first conceptions which our intellect forms when we enter into contact
with the sensible. . . . The actual intellection of principles is no more
innate in us than are the conclusions of our deductive reasoning. . ..
But while we discover the former spontaneously, we have to acquire the
latter at the price of our research.
GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS 215-16 (1956). This
approach to first principles in the practical order appears to have remained
relatively free from criticism.
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good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the
first precept of law, that good is to be done and pursued
and evil is to be avoided.6
This is the foundation on which the natural law theory of St. Thom-
as Aquinas is based and means simply that it is man's essential
nature to follow reason and to do good and avoid evil.
In this same context, St. Thomas lists several examples of
things "apprehended as good to which man has a natural inclina-
tion" including (1) conservation of life; (2) procreation and educa-
tion of offspring; (3) knowledge of truth (avoidance of ignorance);
(4) social existence in the sense of respecting the basic rights of
others; and (5) things of like nature. 7 Is this what Thomas meant
by the natural law? Did he mean more than this or less than this?
These questions have caused controversy since the day St. Thomas
died. It seems safe to say that the primary principles and the natural
inclinations specified above are, indeed, unchanging and common to
all humanity, immutable and universal, and thus meet the two tests
that the natural law must pass.8 If it is assumed that Thomas states
the natural law by saying only that man should follow reason and
do good and avoid evil, then the substance of the law becomes so
vague that it has very little meaning or value. On the other hand,
if it is assumed that he intended that the natural law include more
detailed precepts such as the prohibition against taking human life,
then his theory of natural law must fail because the more detailed
precepts patently cannot pass the tests for natural law principles
that he himself has established-a necessarily fatal defect. Extension
of fundamental natural law to cover precepts against the taking of
human life and other specific forms of conduct is exactly the mis-
take that many so-called natural law philosophers and commenta-
tors on St. Thomas have made, and in so doing they have performed
a great disservice to himY That this should have happened is readily
understandable because, as has been said previously, Thomas did not
fully develop his legal theories and his exposition of some of them
is therefore not entirely clear. His terminology is inexact, and fur-
thermore Thomas frequently digresses from his exposition on law
into theological and sociological matters with dubious results if his
treatise is to be thought of as a legal philosophy for the ages. 10
6 1-II S.T. 94, 2.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. Q. 94, 4-5.
9 The list is long and varied. It ranges all the way from Grotius and Locke
to Maritain and Rommen and on to lesser scholars.
10 Three instances of statements necessarily limited to short run sociology
are his comments on slavery, monarchy, and the role of the judiciary.
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By employing selectively the terminology of Adler, 1 and by
adopting the well developed arguments of a more recent analyst of
Thomistic natural law, '1 2 it is possible to develop some order out of
the chaos and perhaps to apply the theories of the good saint to use-
ful purpose. Let us designate as principles those primary and un-
11 See Adler, A Question about Law, in ESSAYS ON THOMISM 205 (Brennan
ed. 1942).
12 MacGuigan, St. Thomas and Legal Obligation, 35 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 281
(1961); MacGuigan, Positive Law and the Moral Law, 2 CURRENT LAW
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 89 (Macdonald ed. 1961).
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demonstrable truths previously referred to, namely, that it is man's
essential nature to follow reason and do good and avoid evil, as well
as the concomitant things to which man has a natural inclination
-preservation of life, procreation, knowledge, and congenial social
existence. Thus we have specified the substantive content of the
natural law itself in terms of principles, which are considered to be
immutable, universal, immediately known, and rooted in human na-
ture itself. Necessary conclusions from these principles we will call
precepts. Included in this category would be essential conclusions
deduced from natural law, such as the prohibitions against murder,
theft, and lying. Contingent general determinations from the pre-
cepts, such as other less general parts of human positive law, are
designated as rules and might be illustrated by negligence laws and
minor penal statutes. Singular applications of these rules, for ex-
ample judicial decisions in particular cases, we will specify as de-
cisions.
Principles, then, are truths that are arrived at intuitively by
an operation of the intellect; they are not deduced through the pro-
cess of reasoning. Precepts, on the other hand, are the necessary
conclusions deduced by reason from the principles. Rules and deci-
sions are the general and particular determinations reached by a
deductive or inductive process from the precepts. According to this
method of terminology, precepts, rules, and decisions may have their
ultimate source in the natural law but are not technically part of
it. Although the terms used by St. Thomas himself in his explana-
tion of natural law and human law are somewhat indefinite, it does
seem entirely possible to interpret his words in the manner describ-
ed above without doing violence to his fundamental ideas. 13 This
approach provides a concept of natural law reduced to principles
which, though arrived at by metaphysical techniques, is not tied to
theology and is sufficiently detailed to form the basis of a working
body of precepts.
THE ROLE OF HUMAN POSITIVE LAW
St. Thomas recognized that the principles of natural law, while
they are universal and knowable by all, are still rather indefinite
for practical purposes. Therefore, in his discussion of law, he gives
a great deal of attention to human positive law as a means of laying
13 See I-I S.T. 94, 97. Several commentators on the natural law have sug-
gested or adopted this approach. Among them: Dabin in THE LEGAL PHIL-
OSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN (1950); Adler, supra note 11;
D'Entreves, The Case for Natural Law Re-examined, 1 NATURAL L.F. 5
(1956); Davitt, Law as Means to an End - Thomas Aquinas, 14 VAND.
L. R"v. 65 (1960); MacGuigan, supra note 12.
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down the specific provisions necessary for adequate governance of
society.1 4 It is clear that Thomas regarded human law as a necessary
implementation of natural law. In his development of human law
concepts, he brings out the following points: (1) Human law which
is based on natural precepts forms an explicit part of the eternal
law; it derives an obligatory character as the result of this relation-
ship. (2) Not all human law is derived from the principles of natur-
al law; some human law pertains to things outside the purview of
natural law. (3) Human law is directed toward regulations of the
social relationships of man and incorporates sanctions which compel
obedience. In this way, the precepts relating to natural law are en-
forced by something more tangible than the mere sense of obliga-
tion. (4) Human law should attempt to regulate only overt human
acts and does not endeavor to control or prescribe all human acts.
(5) Human law, insofar as it is based on natural law precepts, must
proceed from the will of man in accordance with reason.
THE MORAL LAW
At this point it becomes necessary to introduce another element
into the concept of law. Moral law is defined as precepts derived
from the natural law which are based on right reason and which
govern overt and covert human acts. The idea of moral law is in-
troduced to facilitate the establishment of norms against which hu-
man law can be measured and to provide for the development of a
resistance theory of law.
It will at once be apparent that human positive law and the
moral law which governs social conduct, coincide where human law
is based on natural law precepts;15 it is equally apparent that the
moral law intersects with positive divine law at a number of points.
Moral law is thus flexible enough to apply to covert acts of man
which are incapable of being judged or regulated by human positive
law. Furthermore, it can operate as a norm for judging human law.16
The notion of obligation to perform or refrain from performing cer-
tain acts is introduced by the moral law just as a similar coercive
effect is introduced by the sanction attached to human law. It is in
moral law that the common good and the individual good meet. 17
The moral law concept also permits the application of norms to rules
and decisions since many of these are derived from precepts, and in
14 I-I S.T. 95-96.
15 Adler refers to this part of moral law as ius gentium.
16 The terms "human positive law" and "human law" are considered to be
exactly synonymous in this paper.
17 This discussion of moral law is based on the illuminating development of
the whole subject by MacGuigan, Positive Law and the Moral Law, 2 CUR-
RENT LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 89, 100 (Macdonald ed. 1961).
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so doing, the moral law comes to recognize new customs and regu-
lations.
In the area of precepts, it is apparent that the moral law and
human law are co-extensive except for the distinction that the moral
law "exists" by the mere process of deductive reasoning from a
principle whereas the positive law does not come into being until it
is "willed" or enacted by the designated law-making authority. Once
the human law is enacted, however, then the two types merge and
the moral law applies a "static" norm to the positive law in the
sense that if the human law departs from this norm, it is malum in
se (intrinsically bad, according to St. Thomas) and thus invalid."
In other words, moral law has a substantive effect on human law
that is based on natural law precepts and thus we have developed a
theory of resistance in positive law.
In the area of rules and decisions, the moral law applies "dyna-
mic" norms " which have primarily an adjective effect and operate
on the procedural aspects of such rules and decisions. Therefore, if a
discrepancy exists between the moral law and the rule or decision,
the rule or decision is malum prohibitum (contrary to human wel-
fare in the words of St. Thomas) and ought not to be obeyed unless
there are extenuating circumstances such as avoidance of scandal
or preservation of public order.
Now the question is: how should this resistance theory operate?
Obviously, its critical region is with respect to positive law that is
held to be malum in se, because in such a case there would arise a
binding obligation not to obey the law. Actually, the magnitude of
this problem has been much exaggerated. In the first place positive
law ordinarily touches on the area of natural law precepts in rela-
Is Brown, Natural Law: Dynamic Basis of Law and Morals in the Twentieth
Century, 31 TUL. L. REv. 491 (1957). Professor Brown's interpretation of
Thomistic natural law is open to question; his terminology is, however,
useful.
1.9 Ibid.
KELLY GIRLS * Skilled * Tested * Bonded
Experienced Office Girls to Meet All Law Office Needs
ON YOUR STAFF & ON OUR PAYROLL
- IN DENVER
IN COLORADO SPRINGS 292-2920 * IN GREELEY
633-7646 900 Petroleum Club Bldg. ELgin 24922
1964
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
tively few places. Suppose a law-making body enacted a statute
prohibiting divine worship. Such a law would be malum in se
according to St. Thomas and would also be in conflict with the di-
vine law. The technical objections to a statute of this kind are that
it invades the area of individual moral law, is not a proper subject
of positive law, and would be virtually impossible to enforce. It
would seem very desirable to have a reliable standard for deter-
mining whether or not a statute qualifies as valid law. In the second
place, most of the precepts of the natural law operate negatively;
the only exception that comes to mind is the positive injunction to
provide for the common good. Take, for example, the precept
reflected by the moral law prohibiting theft. To violate this prohibi-
tion the positive law would have to compel those persons bound by
it to commit theft-a rather preposterous idea.2 0 Thirdly, it seems
obvious that the resistance theory should apply only to those
charged with enforcement of the law. It cannot reasonably be the
privilege of every citizen to decide whether he will obey the law or
not. Ordinarily, the initial responsibility for enforcing the law will
fall on the courts. For the three reasons cited above, it should be
apparent that the resistance theory in the substantive sense has very
limited application.
In the region of rules and decisions, the operation of the resist-
ance theory is generally in the sense of requiring natural justice or
what we usually refer to as due process of law. It is not necessary
for the resistance to be applied here as strictly as in the case of laws
that are mala in se, for practical considerations require us to recog-
nize that justice is not always perfect and that there may sometimes
be other factors that have to be taken into account. Nevertheless,
any moral pressure aimed at improving the administration of justice
would appear well directed.
In the more civilized countries, there seem to be only two areas
in which the resistance theory becomes a serious problem: the areas
of divorce as it affects the existence of the family relationship, and
of the power over human life in being as it is reflected in capital
punishment, euthanasia, and abortion. Divorce laws present a prob-
lem because they are widespread and because we don't yet know
with certainty whether the common good is best served by permit-
ting the dissolution of the family relationship under certain circum-
stances. Although many theologians say all divorce is morally
wrong, a final determination may have to depend on sociological
20 It must be conceded that failure to have a law prohibiting theft might
violate the positive moral injunction to provide for the common good.
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evidence yet to be acquired.21 Practically the problem has been
sidestepped either by having judges who disapprove of divorce from
a moral standpoint disqualify themselves or by viewing the divorce
action as not an intrinsically evil act.
As to the power over human life, it may be that if there are any
"absolutes" related to natural law principles and precepts, they
apply here. This area has not given a great deal of difficulty yet, but
it may in the years to come. Abortion and euthanasia are already
legally practiced in many culturally advanced nations, and capital
punishment is permitted in many of the United States. Power over
human life is clearly a moral issue of the highest order and the
greatest care must be taken in resolving it. Perhaps the most appro-
priate thing to say is that the development of man's wisdom may
not as yet have progressed to a level sufficient to warrant entrusting
power over human life to the vicissitudes of human positive law.
We know, for example, that most statutes under which capital pun-
ishment can be imposed are so overlaid with procedural safeguards
that a final decision in a capital case is often not rendered until
years after the initial trial. This can only be regarded as a sign of
lack of confidence in our ability to impose this extreme penalty
without the possibility of error. In any event, the experience in
Nazi Germany is surely the most compelling argument for the per-
petuation of a resistance theory against the possibility that govern-
mental morality may completely break down.
By using the concept of moral law as a parameter, an effort
has been made to demonstrate that there is a body of universal
principles arrived at by metaphysical techniques and applicable to
all mankind that can form the basis of precepts which are express-
ible as human positive law. The positive law formulated from these
precepts is separate from but guided and measured by the norm of
the moral law which in turn is founded on human reason. We have
seen that in some places where precepts are involved, human law
and moral law coincide, but this would not seem to create a fatal
ontological defect in natural law theory. It is further arguable that
positive law of this kind in one political entity should be compatible
with similar law in other political entities of similar cultural
achievement. Here, then, is the start of a common system of positive
substantive law that might be used as the foundation of a world
legal order. The system has the advantage that it is not tied to any
particular theology or arbitrary requirement, although it is entirely
possible that it is compatible with certain theological objectives. By
21 If the definitions given earlier in this paper are correct, divorce is not
governed by natural law principles.
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refining these principles and precepts, it is likely that their appeal
could be widened. Dabin has made a good start in this direction, and
his ideas on justice are particularly interesting and capable of fur-
ther development.2 2 It is to be hoped that someone will be able to
carry on where he, now in the twilight of his career, has paused.
NATURAL LAW AND THE ANALYTICAL POSITIVISTS
It has long been considered by many commentators that natural
law theories and the theories of the analytical positivists are funda-
mentally irreconcilable principally because of the problem of sepa-
rating the law that is from the law that ought to be. It is here sub-
mitted that as a practical matter these two theories are not really
in conflict. It has already been shown that human positive law 23 and
moral law act as a norm of positive law in many places, and where
positive law deals with precepts of the natural law, the two coin-
cide. It has further been demonstrated that the resistance theory of
natural law is very limited in its scope of operation.
22 Dabin, op. cit. supra note 13. A more detailed stipulation of prohibitions
would be another approach.
23 It should at once be recognized by any positivist that the mere enactment
of a law has a moral connotation in the sense that the enactment itself
involves a choice between two or more possible courses of action.
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John Austin's theory of positive law 24 has been severely criti-
cized in many particulars. Probably the most criticized of all his
statements is his injunction to adhere strictly to the positive law
exactly as it is, as distinguished from what the interpreter thinks it
ought to be. However, it is not to be expected that Austin's writing
was entirely free from the possibility of error in terms of modern
application, any more than was the writing of St. Thomas Aquinas.
It is essential to remember what Austin was trying to do: he was
endeavoring to develop a technique for the analysis of positive law
with the end in view of erecting a concise body of legal statements
that could be clearly understood as law.25 He was concerned mainly
with law after it came into existence (when the moral decision has
already been made) and felt that if the legal terminology problem
could be solved, the legal statements could be made precise enough
so that very little "interpretation" of them would be required. Later
writers have improved considerably on Austin's basic theories.
Probably the most eloquent spokesman on analytical positivism
today is Professor H. L. A. Hart,2'26 who seems to have some reserva-
tions regarding the extent to which Austin's major objective can be
achieved in light of present day experience. Hart's elucidation of
what he terms the "penumbral effect" is at least one attempt at
framing an alternative approach7
It seems accurate to say that the analytical positivists continue
to concentrate on legal certainty in written law through the intro-
duction of exact terminology, an eminent objective indeed. Nor is it
apparent that there is any more fundamental conflict between ana-
lytical positivism and natural law than Bodenheimer finds between
positivism and legal realism.2 ' After suggesting that the positivists
ought not to try to make the printed law too rigid, thus foreclosing
to the judge the possibility of injecting any ad hoc historical or
sociological elements into his decision, Bodenheimer says the real
problem is: "failure . . . to provide the judiciary with a well consid-
ered theory of the non-formal (i.e., non-positive) sources of the
law.' '9 - Hart appears also to realize this, and the question now is
24 AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
25 This argument is persuasively advanced by Bodenheimer in an excellent
commentary on analytical positivism entitled Analytical Positivism, Legal
Realism, and the Future of Legal Method, 44 VA. L. REV. 365 (1958).
26 See for example HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Some of Hart's ideas
seem a little obscure, but he has plenty of time ahead of him for fuller
development of his theory. His work has unquestionably made analytical
positivism a much more workable theory and Hart has been able to answer
adequately many of Austin's severest critics.
27 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).
28 Bodenheimer, supra note 25, at 370.
29 Id. at 375.
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asked: Might not the principles and precepts of the natural law fill
the gap?3 0
NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL REALISM
Probably the most significant recent contribution to jurispru-
dence is that made by the legal realists, including Holmes, Cardozo,
and Llewellyn.31 The self styled natural law writers have been cry-
ing "wolf" apparently on the ground that man is in danger of being
dehumanized by realist techniques. But what can possibly be wrong
with the application of modern scientific techniques to the making
of positive law and the rendering of judicial decisions? This appears
to do nothing more than follow the advice of St. Thomas to examine
with a critical eye precepts, rules, and decisions in order to insure
that they are in accord with the dictates of reason.32 It should be
recalled that every bit of natural law and derivation from it that
has been discussed in this paper is rooted either in the natural incli-
nations of man or based on human reason-and this includes even
our parametric moral law. We have, indeed, stacked our chips on
human nature and reason. There appears to be no real barrier be-
tween natural law theory as formulated here and the legal realists
when Professor Jones can write:
The ethical theory to be drawn from legal realism is, I
suggest, that the moral dimension of law is to be sought
not in rules and principles, but in the process of responsible
decision, which pervades the whole law in life.3
Both the natural law advocate and the positivist may wish to cau-
tion the realist against excessive tailoring of the law to individual
situations at the expense of legal predictability, simplicity, and so-
cial order, but neither can gainsay the desire of the realist to get at
objective facts and to make the law respond to human needs insofar
as is reasonably possible. Cardozo, one of the greatest legal philo-
sophers of this century and a legal realist of the first water, may
somewhat misconceive the role of our natural law theory when he
quotes Berolzheimer as saying:
The modern philosophy of law comes in contact with the
natural law philosophy in that the one as well as the other
30It should be mentioned that Austin's predecessor, Bentham, worked out a
legal theory on the basis of utility, pain, and pleasure with a calculus of
legal values which incorporates substantive law aspects. Bentham's approach
does not seem best adapted to meet the problem that Bodenheimer outlines.
31 Whether Pound can be considered a true realist is debatable. His sociological
objectives of law are certainly compatible with those of the realists even
if his methodology is not.
32 1-II S.T. 94, 4-5.
33 H. W. Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1961). '
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seeks to be the science of the just. But the modern philo-
sophy of law departs essentially from the natural law
philosophy in that the latter seeks a just, natural law out-
side of positive law, while the new philosophy of law de-
sires to deduce and fix the element of the just in and out of
the positive law-out of what it is and of what is becom-
ing.3
4
If the formulation of natural law theory contained in this paper
has any value, the gap between "natural law philosophy" and "the
new philosophy of law" does not seem to be as great as is expressed
by the words of the quotation.
3 5
CONCLUSION
To summarize briefly, the objective of this paper has been to
reduce natural theory to a set of practical concepts which are essen-
tially consistent with the expressed legal doctrines of St. Thomas
Aquinas and which can fill an urgent requirement of the present day
-that of providing the basis of a world legal order. Natural law
principles might be recognized as the foundation from which to de-
rive precepts expressed as positive law pertaining to some subjects
and implied as an unwritten moral law pertaining to other matters.
A further effort has been made to show that the natural law theory
thus formulated is compatible with the two most significant legal
,-heories of our day, analytical positivism and legal realism. In devel-
oping this formulation of natural law theory, great care has been
taken in the definition and use of technical terms in the hope of
eliminating confusion and of communicating ideas efficiently.
There is only one real reason for taking this approach to natural
law theory: it is infinitely preferable to have a workable and accept-
able body of law with which to meet a pressing jurisprudential need
than to see a fine source of substantive law relegated to the category
of legal history. In striving for this objective, as in the resolution of
most complex problems, some compromises have had to be made. It
has been necessary virtually to separate natural law theory from
,neology-certainly from any particular theology. 6 Natural law
principles have been tied to the natural inclinations of man as
arrived at by metaphysical methods, and natural law precepts and
34 2 BEROLZHEIMER, SYSTEM DER RECHTS UND WIRTH - SCHAFTPHILOSOPHIE
27, Quoted by CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 132 (1921).
35 It is well to remember that the quoted words were written shortly after the
turn of the century and that consequently Berolzheimer's - and even Car-
dozo's - view of natural law theory may have been quite. different from
that outlined in this paper.
36 It does not appear that the approach taken makes natural theory incon-
sistent with any particular theology.
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the moral law have been, for better or for worse, firmly linked to
the dictates of human reason. Simplification has been necessary. A
good many commentators will argue that by taking these steps the
natural law has been deprived of its character of absoluteness and
made too relativistic 3 7 in addition to being oversimplified beyond
recognition. There may be some substance to these charges, but,
though the risk is great, it is at least arguable that some acceptable
natural law is preferable to none at all. With careful development,
this flexible natural law theory may prove useful beyond the wildest
expectations of its advocates.
Really original and useful ideas in any field are rare and, in the
area of philosophy, almost impossible to produce. The best that can
be hoped for here is that some clarity has been added to existing
ideas and current thinking related to natural law so that a better
understanding of these theories will result.
17 Davitt seems to include just such a caveat at the conclusion of his article
on the natural law of St. Thomas, supra note 12, at 80, when he makes
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COMMENTS
STATUTORY RAPE - DEFENSES - A BONA FIDE AND REASON-
ABLE MISTAKE AS TO THE PROSECUTRIX's AGE IS A DEFENSE TO
STATUTORY RAPE.
A significant development in criminal law has recently taken
place in California. A seventeen year and nine month old girl vol-
untarily had intercourse with one Hernandez, who was under a
bona fide and reasonable belief that she was over the age of con-
sent.' Hernandez was convicted of statutory rape. He appealed, as-
signing as error the trial court's refusal to allow evidence of his be-
lief as to the girl's age. The Supreme Court of California reversed,
reasoning that a crime, even the crime of rape, requires a union of
act and intent, and that if the defendant reasonably believes the
female to be over the age of consent, the requisite intent is lacking.
People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
It has long been settled that if the female was actually under
the age of consent at the time of the act of intercourse, the defend-
ant was guilty whether or not he knew her true age.2 The law de-
termined her capacity to give operative consent and the defendant's
belief as to the facts, however reasonable, was irrelevant.3 Hernan-
dez appears to be the first statutory rape case in the United States
to allow the introduction of evidence for the purpose of showing as
a defense that the defendant had a bona fide belief that the female
was over the age of consent.4 In doing so the court expressly over-
ruled sixty-eight years of California precedent.5 Other states have
1 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261-1. Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, under . . . the following
circumstances:
1. Where the female is under the age of eighteen years ....
2 Efsiever v. People, 105 Colo. 88, 96 P.2d 8 (1939), wherein the evidence
that prosecutrix told defendant she was twenty years old was uncontradicted.
3 People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711 (1897); Manship v. People, 99
Colo. 1, 58 P.2d 1215 (1936); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310
(1910); State v. Sherman, 106 Iowa 684, 77 N.W. 461 (1898); Common-
wealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896); Smith v. State, 44
Tex. Crim. 137, 68 S.W. 995 (1902).
4 A number of states have by statute, however, made such belief a defense.
See, e.g., 38 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 11-4(b) : "It shall be an affirmative
defense to indecent liberties with a child that: (1) the accused reasonably
believed the child was of the age of 16 or upwards at the time of the act
giving rise to the charge .... " N.M. STAT. § 40-A-9-3 (1953) : " . . . A
reasonable belief on the part of the male at the time of the alleged crime
that the female was sixteen [161 years of age or older is a defense to crim-
inal liability for statutory rape."
5 The rule was established at least as early as People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132,
46 Pac. 915 (1896). An examination of the California cases which have
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allowed presentation of such evidence, but as a consideration in
passing sentence rather than as a defense.0
The traditional argument supporting such absolute liability,
premised on protection of the "innocent child," has been stated by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky:
The victim is without capacity and discretion to have
a proper conception of the character of the offense being
committed against her person, or to comprehend its con-
sequences fully, or perhaps to possess the strength of will to
resist the influence and importunities of the ravisher. That
is actually so of an idiot and presumptively so of a child.
7
The validity of this argument is questionable.'
Counsel for Hernandez did not attempt to prove that the prose-
cutrix had the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse.9 Instead,
they argued that unless intent is expressly or by necessary implica-
tion excluded by statute,"' a crime requires a joint operation of act
cited Ratz revealed no statutory rape cases. Apparently the question of
admission of evidence showing defendant's belief as to the prosecutrix's
age was not argued in the Supreme Court of California from the time of
the Ratz decision until the advent of Hernandez.
6 See, e.g., Law v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. 444, 224 P.2d 278 (1950) ; People v.
Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y. Supp. 524 (1st Dep't 1911). Admission
of evidence showing the defendant's lack of 9nens rea comports with the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which expressly allows such
evidence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
The comments to Tentative Draft Number 4, at 253, indicate that this
provision of the code is based on the fact that after a girl passes the age
of ten she begins to obtain a maturity which justifies the belief that she is
over the critical age.
7 Golden v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 379, 385, 158 S.W.2d 967, 969 (1942).
California itself utilized similar reasoning in People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132,
46 Pac. 915 (1896), in which the court said: "The protection of society, of
the family, and of the infant, demand that one who has carnal intercourse
under such circumstances shall do so in peril of the fact, and he will not
be heard against the evidence to urge his belief that the victim of his
outrage has passed the period which would make his act a crime."
8 See KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
347 (1948). In recent years extensive surveys of sexual behavior patterns
have indicated that nearly 50% of the males between adolescence and the
age of fifteen in low socio-economic groups, and over 10% of the males in
middle and higher socio-economic groups experience heterosexual relations.
These relations are generally with school companions, thus indicating that
the above figures could be applied, though to a lesser degree, to females of
the same age and socio-economic groups. Mr. Justice Peek concludes, with
some justification, that a girl who belongs to a group whose members in-
dulge in sexual intercourse at an early age is likely to acquire an insight
into the rewards and penalties of sexual indulgence. 393 P.2d at 674. The
statutory presumption that all females under the age of consent do not
have the capacity to comprehend the consequences of such acts is hardly
realistic. The fact that so few charges of statutory rape are brought causes
the author of this comment to doubt the preventive value of statutory rape
sanctions to these groups.
9 Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-11.
10 People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
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and intent." They showed that the California Code does not ex-
pressly exclude intent as a requirement of rape,'1 2 and its exclusion
cannot be reasonably implied. In addition, the section of the Code
governing capacity to commit a crime excludes therefrom one who
11 CAL. PENAL CODE § 20. "In every crime or public offense there must exist
a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
12 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261. "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished
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commits the act under ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
any criminal intent.13 Therefore, they argued, if the defendant had
a bona fide and reasonable belief that the prosecutrix was over the
age of consent, the intent required for commission of the crime was
lacking.
The Hernandez decision is an extension of a marked trend in
California away from the imposition of criminal sanctions in the
absence of culpability. The supreme court had previously held that
a good faith belief of a prior divorce is a defense to a bigamy
charge,14 non-negligent ignorance of faulty labeling is a defense to
a charge under the California Health and Safety Code,'1 5 and lack
of negligence is a defense to charges under the crimes against chil-
dren statutes.16 The first two of these cases had an element in com-
mon with Hernandez: the defendant was either ignorant of or rea-
sonably mistaken as to the facts. The California court has ruled that
"intent" is necessary for the commission of these crimes and that
knowledge of the facts, or an unreasonable lack of knowledge, is an
essential element of that intent.
A disturbing factor in Hernandez is the court's failure to men-
tion the distinction which has often been made between such crimes
as bigamy and faulty labeling on the one hand, and statutory rape
on the other.17 In the latter case, even if the facts were as the de-
fendant believed them to be, he would still be committing fornica-
tion, an immoral and, in many states, illegal act.' 8 In the bigamy
and labeling cases, if the defendant's belief were true, he would
be free of moral as well as legal guilt.
Failure to recognize the distinction renders the ultimate mean-
ing of Hernandez unclear. The court indicated that "it cannot be
a greater wrong to entertain a bona fide but erroneous belief that
a valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse has been obtained"1 9
than to remarry in good faith reliance on an invalid divorce. One
can hardly believe that the court sees no difference between mar-
ital and extramarital intercourse, and must therefore conclude that
this issue was overlooked entirely. It is not possible to determine
whether the decision extends to acts which are illegal if the facts
13 CAL. PENAL CODE § 26. "All persons are capable of committing crimes except
those belonging to the following classes: . . .
"Four - Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged
under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent."
14 People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
15 People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956).
16 People v. Roderiguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d 433, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863.
'7 See, e.g., State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 (1859); State v. Audette, 81 Vt. 400,
70 Atl. 833 (1908) ; Regina v. Prince, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 138 (1875).
18 Fornication is not a crime in California. In re Lane, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 367
P.2d 673 (1962) ; People v. Hopwood, 130 Cal. App. 168, 19 P.2d 824 (1933).
19 393 P.2d at 677.
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are as the defendant believes them to be, or is confined to those
which may be immoral.
20
Despite the shortcomings of this case, California has made a
significant return to the common law requirement of mens rea in
all crimes by applying the "intent" requirement to statutory rape.
At common law there is no crime without a union of act and in-
tent,21 and many states22 have general statutory provisions similar
to California's 23 which expressly require intent. The so-called "pub-
lic welfare offenses '24 exist as an exception to this general princi-
ple. It has been suggested 25 that the theory behind imposition of
criminal liability for acts classified as "public welfare offenses"
requires that they meet at least two criteria. First, the crime must
have been created primarily for regulatory purposes such as traffic
control or business regulation and not for the purpose of singling
2 0
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 833 (1957), indicates that a conviction upon
mistake of fact can be obtained only where the act as the defendant saw it
would constitute a crime or "involved a high degree of moral delinquency,"
giving statutory rape as an example. Regina v. Prince, 13 Cox Crim. Cas.
138, 141 (1875) states that the act need not be illegal, merely "wrong."
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 375 (2d ed. 1947) reaches
the conclusion that "This branch of our law [strict penal liability] is so
thoroughly disorganized, rests so largely on conjecture and dubious psy-
chology, and effects such gross injustice as to require major reform." It is
questionable, in this sense at least, whether Hernandez is more than a first
groping step in the right direction.
21 People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 627, 122 N.E. 155, 157 (1919). "At common law
a crime consisted of an unlawful act with evil intent .... .
22 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §40-1-1 (1963). "A crime or misdemeanor consists
in a violation of a public law in the commission of which there shall be an
union or joint operation of act, and intention or criminal negligence." COLO.
REV. STAT. § 40-1-2 (1963). "Intention is manifested by the circumstances
connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and dis-
cretion of the person accused."
23 CAL. PENAL CODE § 20.
24 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1933). The term,
"public welfare offenses," is used to denote the group of police offenses and
criminal nuisances punishable irrespective of the actor's state of mind,
which have developed in England and the United States within approxi-
mately the last century.
25 Id. at 72.
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out individual wrongdoers. Second, the possible penalty for a viola-
tion must be relatively light because sentencing an individual to
prison for an act free from moral guilt would be repugnant to the
community sense of justice. The Supreme Court of California has
followed these principles in Henandez. Statutory rape is a crime
created for the purpose of singling out individuals for punishment
by infliction of a serious penalty. It is not, therefore, a "public
welfare offense," and mens rea is required for its commission.
A further ambiguity in Hernandez is found in the determina-
tion of the quantum of culpability necessary to constitute the re-
quisite mens rea. The court says:
There can be no dispute that a criminal intent exists
when the perpetrator proceeds with utter disregard of, or
in the lack of grounds for [sic], a belief that the female
has reached the age of consent. But if he participates in a
mutual act of sexual intercourse, believing his partner
to be beyond the age of consent, with reasonable grounds
for such belief, where is his criminal intent?
26
The Model Penal Code defines four kinds of culpability: pur-
posely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.2 7 It then specifically
provides that the degree of culpability required to establish the of-
fense of statutory rape is recklessness.2 8 On the other hand, the
statement of the Supreme Court of California seems to indicate that
mere negligence is sufficient. While the California Penal Code's re-
quirement that "There must exist a union, or joint operation of act
and intent, or criminal negligence '12 9 can be interpreted as calling
for more than mere tort negligence, and perhaps even something
approaching recklessness 3 the court does not seem to follow this
approach."'
The view of the Model Penal Code is usually regarded as the
common law position,3 2 and is believed by the author of this com-
ment to be the better reasoned view. Hernandez may not have gone
far enough in this respect.
Jon F. Kidneigh
26 393 P.2d at 676.
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
28 Id. § 2.02 (3): "When the culpability sufficient to establish a material
element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established
if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly thereto."
29 CAL. PENAL CODE § 20.
30 Cf. PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW & ITS PROcEssEs 589 (1962).
31 "No responsible person would hesitate to condemn as untenable a claimed
good faith belief in the age of consent of an 'infant' female whose obviously
tender years preclude the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief."
393 P.2d at 677.
32 Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMB. L. J. 31
(1936).
1964
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
TAXATION - ESTATES AND TRUSTS - DOUBLE DEDUCTION OF
TRUSTEES' FEES.
Two months before her death, the decedent transferred proper-
ty into a revocable trust, retaining a life estate therein. Upon her
death the value of the property so transferred was included in her
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes under the authority of
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 2035,1 2036,2 and 2038.3 Under the
trust agreement the trustee was authorized to perform certain du-
ties4 after the settlor's death, and in connection therewith the
trustee paid trustee's fees in the amount of $22,934.79. Of this
amount the Tax Court5 allowed a deduction of $21,934.79 on the
trust's income tax return under the authority of section 212,6 and
also allowed a deduction of $22,096.78 on the estate tax return un-
der the authority of section 2053 (b).7
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding
(1) that section 642 (g) I does not require the disallowance of double
deductions in computing the income tax of a trust, even though the
trust property was included in the taxable estate; and (2) that the
authority of Treasury Regulation § 1.212-1 (o),9 which applies to sec-
tions 212 and 16210 in the disallowance of double deductions, has no
I Relating to transactions in contemplation of death. All transfers of property,
without adequate consideration, made within three years of the decedent's
death are presumed to have been made in contemplation of death and there-
fore are included in the gross estate. (All Section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.)
2 Relating to transfers with a retained life estate. Such a transfer is accom-
plished when, without adequate consideration, a person placing property in
a trust retains for his life the possession, enjoyment, or right to the income
from the property.
3 Relating to revocable transfers. When property has been transferred without
adequate consideration into a trust, it is includable in the gross estate of
the one so transferring if on the date of the death of that person he held
the power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust.
4 The trust agreement authorized the trustee to pay the expenses of the
settlor's last illness, pay the estate and inheritance taxes, and make certain
distributions.
5 Mary E. Burrow Trust, 39 T.C. 1080 (1963).
6 Relating to expenses for the management and conservation of income, the
property from which it is produced, and expenses paid in connection with
the determination of any tax.
7 Relating to administrative expenses of nonprobate property.
8 Section 642(g) "Disallowance of Double Deductions. - Amounts allowable
under section 2053 or 2054 as a deduction in computing the taxable estate
of a decedent shall not be allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable
income of the estate . . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
9 Treas. Reg. § 1. 2 12-1(o) (1957) "The provisions of section 212 are not
intended in any way to disallow expenses which would otherwise be allow-
able under section 162 and the regulations thereunder. Double deductions
are not permitted. Amounts deducted under one provision of the Internal




effect on section 642 (g). Commissioner v. Mary E. Burrow Trust,
333 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1964).
Prior to 1942 there were no statutory provisions regarding the
deduction of one expense in computing both the taxable estate and
the taxable income thereof. However, it was held in court decisions
that the deduction would be allowed in computing both the tax-
able estate and the taxable income since the taxes were provided
for under different statutes" and were based upon different theor-
ies.1 2 Unless Congress had specifically prohibited the double deduc-
tion of an expense, it would be deductible under both statutes al-
lowing for the deduction.
1"
A 1942 amendment 14 to the Code provided that if an item was
deducted in accordance with section 812 (b)'15 in computing the tax-
able estate, it could not be again deducted as an expense under sec-
tion 2311 in computing the taxable income of the estate. The purpose
of section 162 (e) was to prevent a taxpayer from claiming one ex-
pense as a deduction for two separate purposes, 7 though there were
10 Relating to trade or business expenses.
I' Kleberg v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 95 (1934). Acquiesced in by the Com-
missioner, XIII-2 Cum. Bull. 11 (1934). But see O'Neil v. Commissioner, 31
B.T.A. 727 (1934), in which the court did not allow property taxes owing
at the date of the decedent's death to be deducted in computing the estate's
taxable income when the item had already been deducted in computing the
taxable estate. It appears that the only reconciling feature between these
two cases is that in the Kleberg case the amounts expended were for the
administration of the decedent's property after his death, while in the
O'Neil case the amount expended only represented an accrued expense at
the decedent's death, and thus only properly deducted from the estate corpus
on the estate tax return.
12 Kleberg v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 100. The estate tax is a one-time
excise on the transfer of property while the income tax is an annual tax on
net income.
13 Adams v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1940); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 74 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1934).
14Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 162(e), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 861 (1942).
15 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 812 (b), relating to the expenses, losses, indebted-
ness, and taxes of an estate.
VId. § 23, relating to the allowable deductions from gross income.
17 Luehrmann's Estate v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 10 (8th Cir. 1961).
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no prohibitions against allocating the expense deduction between
the taxable estate and the taxable income of the estate in any man-
ner desired.'8 Accordingly it was subsequently held that an executor
who deducted his commissions in computing the taxable estate
could not deduct these commissions in computing the taxable in-
come of the estate.' 9 The provisions of section 162 (e) were essential-
ly carried over as section 642 (g) of the 1954 Code.
2 0
The Burrow Trust case is the first to determine whether sec-
tion 642 (g) extends to trusts the property of which is included in
the taxable estate. The decision of the court is in accord with the
well-established rules that tax statutes are to be strictly construed,
21
and that there are to be no implications from the statute beyond the
clear language used therein.22 The court reasoned that Congress
must have intended to omit the words "or trust" following the
words "taxable income of the estate" in section 642(g), since all
the other subsections of section 642 use the words "estate or trust."
The Commissioner argued that the language of Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.212-1 (o),23 that "Amounts deducted under one provision
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 cannot again be deducted un-
der any other provision thereof," applies to all sections of the 1954
Code.24 The court disagreed, observing that the Regulation refers
specifically to deductions which might properly be made under
either section 212 or under section 162, which provides for deduc-
tions for trade or business expense. Judge Lewis noted that the sub-
stance of Treasury Regulation § 1.212-1 (o) was already in effect
when section 162 (e) of the 1939 Code was enacted, 25 and concluded
that if the Commissioner's contention was correct there would have
been no need for section 162 (e).
In addition to section 642 (g) there is at least one other Code
provision which allows the same expense to be deducted on both
the estate tax and the income tax returns. Section 691 (b) allows a
deduction on the estate's income tax return for the payment of ex-
18 Rev. Rul. 240, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 79.
19 Simon v. Hoey, 88 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 354, cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 966 (1950).
20 Supra note 8.
21 Masonite Corp. v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1952).
22 Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1955) ; DeLuxe Check Printers
v. Kelm, 99 F. Supp. 785 (D.C. Minn. 1951); Mead Corp. v. Commissioner,
116 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1941); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives and
Granting Annuities v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
23 Supra note 9.
24 This argument was not raised in the Tax Court.
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(o) (1957) was Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.23 under Int.
Rev. Code of 1939. Immediately prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code,
the Regulation was cited as Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(a)-15(m).
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penses which were accrued on the date of the decedent's death.26
The accrued expenses also constitute claims against the estate, and
as such are deductible under the authority of section 2053 (a) (3)
in computing the taxable estate. Although section 642 (g) refers to
section 2053 generally, the Regulations state that section 642 (g)
will not affect the operation of section 691 (b) .27 The reason for this
is that section 691 (b) relates to expenses accrued at the date of
death, while section 642 (g) only pertains to those expenses incurred
after the date of death.
The Commissioner generally follows a policy of either acquies-
cence or nonacquiescence in a decision of the Tax Court since he
does not feel bound by a Tax Court decision as a matter of law.
28
As of the date of this Comment, the Commissioner has published
neither his acquiescence nor nonacquiescence in the decision of the
Burrow Trust case. There has been no appeal since the Solicitor
General denied the Commissioner the authority to file a writ of
certiorari. 29 As a result, we are left with a decision by which the
Commissioner does not feel bound, and consequently future at-
tempts at the kind of deductions used in Burrow Trust will pro-
bably be met by opposition from the Internal Revenue Service.
Alan D. Lewis
26 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1939 the comparable provision was section 126(b).
This provision is limited to expenses arising from either a trade or business,
interest, taxes, production, conservation, or management of income, or
depletion.
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.642(g)-2 (1956).
28 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.94 (Zimet Revision 1958).
29 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP., vol. 7, p. 70,807 (revised to 10-14-64).
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HOW HIGH IS UP
By DAVID LOTH AND MORRIS L. ERNST
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. ix, 275. $4.50.
The central problem of the growth and development of the
common law has always been how to strike a balance between sta-
bility and change. The task of the common law judge which causes
the greatest difficulty is that of applying established principles and
precedents to new problems. Those judges who are remembered by
history, who provide grist for the "casebook" mills which unlock
the mysteries of legal logic for generation after generation of law
students, are the ones most adept at fitting "the law" to the new
problems of society. We neither salute nor condemn the judge who
routinely judges; rather, we save our ammunition for the judge
who innovates.
This pragmatic quality of the common law in solving the prob-
lems of today with the law of yesterday through the fits and starts
of the bold judge is taxed to the utmost in times of rapid scientific
advancement and technological progress. The intense casuistry of
the common law, which must needs wait for the right case and the
right judge, which tentatively gropes for a tentative solution for
the new value conflicts, makes the common law lag far behind the
needs of a modern technological society. What tends to happen
when the common law lags too far behind the scientific and social
realities is that society grows impatient with the common law ap-
proach and legislates. Then, of course, the common law reasserts
at least a modicum of authority in interpreting the statute and oc-
casionally invalidates the statute to preserve the superior values of
"freedom" or "property."
The above comments illustrate what the book, How High Is Up,
is ultimately about. The authors have attempted to show the lay-
man how law adapts to change.' The technique used is to take sev-
eral modern problems which have created or are creating legal dif-
ficulties and show how legal principles and precedents have been
applied to solution of the problems. In general, the authors have
done a fine job of selection and presentation thus making the book
interesting for the lawyer as well as the layman.
In the first chapter, titled "How High Is Up," the authors ex-
plore the legal problems caused by the Air Age and Space Age in-
1 The anthropomorphic implications are those of the authors; I would phrase
the problem as how lawyers, judges and legislators adapt the law to the
changing needs of society.
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terference with the Old Age (or, perhaps, age old) concepts of pro-
perty law. The starting point, quite properly, is the case of United
States v. Causby2 which dealt with the ownership of air space and
a taking of that property right by low and frequent overflights.
The Causby case is, of course, only a starting point and the authors
have skilfully used that litigation to develop discussions of aviation
nuisances such as noise, fumes and vibrations, sky piracy, new
modes of air transportation, and sovereignty over space.
A natural follow-up to the first chapter title is that of the sec-
ond chapter, "And How Deep Is Down." This chapter is one of the
weakest in the book dealing as it does with a rather unusual and
limited legal problem-subterranean property rights of landowners
in relation to natural gas storage. The authors point out that the
first aquifer gas reservoir was developed in 1946 and that today
about 15 reservoirs are scattered over nine states. The natural legal
device for handling the reservoir arrangement is a negotiated lease
between landowner and gas storage company. The real problem,
however, is what legal principles will govern the inevitable future
litigations as some landowners refuse to lease underground storage
space.
One of the best chapters in the book is the third, "Let the Seller
Beware," which deals with the twentieth century revolution in the
law of products liability. The authors tell the story of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co.3 and Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores4 to
illustrate Cardozo's revolution in changing caveat emptor to caveat
vendor. Then follows an extended discussion of the implied war-
ranty of fitness cases as applied to blood transfusions, Salk polio
vaccine, and cigarettes and lung cancer. Finally, the problem of
marketing new and possibly dangerous drugs is considered.
2 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
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Atomic energy, the subject matter of the fourth chapter, is lik-
ened by the authors to a genie in a bottle which, upon release, is
capable of great good or great harm. Tort liability for radiation
damage, location of nuclear reactors, and control of atomic testing
are the problems considered.
The fifth and sixth chapters deal with some of the basic con-
cepts of property law and tort law as challenged by two modern and
emerging technological wonders-climate control and sonic booms.
The few cases which have already been decided are placed in con-
text with the larger and yet unanswered questions.
Chapter seven compares the development of the right of pri-
vacy and the attendant tort liability for invasions of the right with
the more recent development of a right of publicity and the com-
mercial exploitation of the names of famous people. The case used
to illustrate the problem is O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.,5 a fascinating
litigation involving the unconsented use of a strict teetotaler foot-
ball star's picture on a beer company calendar. A number of other
equally interesting cases are reviewed and placed in context.
Chapter eight, "The Modern Judgment of Solomon," is con-
cerned with the tremendous legal problems caused by attempting
to reconcile the established concepts of family law and distribution
of property with the growing use of artificial insemination. The
authors use American, Canadian and English cases to illustrate the
widely divergent solutions that judges and lawyers have so far of-
fered.
The ninth chapter, "Shifting Boundaries of Freedom," is, I
think, the least satisfactory in the book. The authors have tried to
coalesce three different problems into an amalgam showing how
law accommodates individual eccentricities and societal needs. Un-
fortunately, the three problems do not hold together very well. The
problems caused by chemical pesticides, flood plain legislation, and
aesthetic zoning could have each been the subject of a separate
chapter.
The final chapter deals with the use of scientific devices to as-
certain truth in judicial proceedings. In addition to the often con-
sidered status of polygraph results as competent evidence, the au-
thors discuss the related problems of "truth serum," blood alcohol
tests and hypnotism. At the end of this chapter, the authors make
a point that lawyers often overlook:
The unsung hero of the lawsuits is the determined liti-
gant, the stubborn, outraged, patient, perhaps greedy fellow
who goes all out for his rights and defends yours and mine
5 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
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in the process. Aviation would not be the servant of pro-
gress it has become without the chicken farmer Causby.
How could Cardozo have made his revolution if Mr. Mac-
Pherson had been willing to let Buick tell him, "Let the
buyer beware"? Surely, win, lose or draw, Dr. Stover and
Ben Hogan, the rancher Rounsaville and the resort owner
Slutsky, E. F. Peterson et al. and Electrical Union have
fought the battle of freedom for each of us. I would like to
see the Bench and the Bar lead us in a standing ovation to
all of them.6
As I've indicated before, this book should be worth while for
lawyers as well as laymen because the problems are stated accur-
ately and the legal issues handled in a very competent fashion. Mor-
ris L. Ernst's contributions are unfortunately rather minimal, tak-
ing the form of letters to David Loth at the end of each chapter.
7
My one objection to the book, which does not at all detract from
its readability, is that the lay reader may get the erroneous impres-
sion that the law (and especially the common law) is the only in-
stitution in society that can handle the types of problems presented.
Law is only one facet of human existence and societal experience
and although Americans rush to the law like jackals to the carcass
other institutions may be just as, if not more, capable of solving the
problem of individuality in an age of galloping technology.
Morton Gitelman
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER
6 p. 271.
7 Although the greatest portion of the book is written by David Loth, a lay-
man, it is extremely well written. The only description of Mr. Loth offered
by the publisher is that he has written many books, is a teacher, and lives
in Nyack, New York. For many years I have had a well-written book by a
David Loth in my library - "The Brownings: A Victorian Idyll" (N.Y.,
Tudor Press, 1929). I assume the same Mr. Loth authored both books.
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